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Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) is a powerful technique for building software
that tolerates arbitrary failures. The technique has been developed since the 70s
and has a rich research literature. Yet no production system has adopted the
technique, despite an increasing need from today’s large and complex systems.
An important reason is that a BFT system incurs significantly higher costs than
a crash-tolerant counterpart. The costs include developmental costs, as a BFT
system is harder to design and implement correctly, and operational costs, as a
BFT system requires to run on more machines, employs more expensive crypto-
graphic operations, and sends more and larger messages.
This dissertation attempts to reduce both developmental and operational
costs of BFT distributed applications. In the first part, we propose an approach
to translate existing crash-tolerant systems to Byzantine-fault-tolerant. Our ap-
proachmakes fewer assumptions about the source crash-tolerant distributed ap-
plications, and thus it is applicable to a larger set of applications than existing
approaches. We propose and prove correct our basic approach. Then we ex-
tend the basic approach to large scale distributed applications and propose ad-
ditional mechanisms to deal with practical problems in such settings—namely,
replication and host churns. We evaluate our scalable translation approach by a
simulation and case studies.
The second part of the dissertation presents a novel Byzantine replication
approach that focuses on reducing resource costs (but can also be used as a
translation). By leveraging an external reconfiguration service, our replication
approach requires only t+ 1 replicas and t witnesses (lighter hosts) to tolerate t
Byzantine faults. Our approach also uses inexpensiveHMAC signatures and im-
poses a chain communication pattern between the replicas to reduce CPU and
network consumptions. We also propose a variation of the approach, in which
Byzantine hosts do not forge CRC checksums, to further reduce the resource
costs. In particular, it uses t+ 1 replicas, CRC checksums, and t fewer rounds of
communication. We evaluate the performance of a prototype of each variation
in the common case, when it runs without failures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the world becomes more and more connected, we become increasingly de-
pendent on online services. We use traditional digital services such as data
storage to store our files (e.g., [7, 4, 18]), photos (e.g., [14, 28, 23]), video clips
(e.g., [30, 5, 17]), etc., so that we can access them anywhere and share them
with friends and family all over the world. We also depend on online ser-
vices for other work, ranging from mundane tasks such as ordering pizzas
(e.g., [21, 6]) and getting directions (e.g. [16, 13]), to important tasks such as
banking (e.g., [3, 27, 15]), payment processing (e.g., [12, 22, 1]), trading stocks
(e.g., [11, 24, 8]), applying for jobs (e.g., [19]), and governmental document pro-
cessing (e.g., [25, 20, 26]). There are more online services today than ever, and
the number of such services keeps increasing rapidly.
Online services not only grow in numbers, but also grow in size. By the time
this dissertation is being written, Facebook [9], Yahoo! Mail [29], and Ama-
zon [2] have reached more than 500 million, 250 million, and 81 million users,
respectively [10, 74, 126]. To accommodate the great numbers of users, online
services need to spread the load over many machines. Service providers run dis-
tributed applications that coordinate the machines to implement the services.
To be competitive, service providers need to keep users’ data safely and keep
their services up and running as much as possible despite machine and software
failures. However, building a fault tolerant distributed application is expensive,
especially when the failures can be arbitrary (a.k.a. Byzantine). In this disserta-
tion, we will look into techniques that lower the costs of developing and run-
ning distributed applications when facing arbitrary failures.
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This chapter introduces the problem. Section 1.1 discusses the challenges
that motivated this research. Section 1.2 presents our fault tolerance approach to
distributed applications. The approach helps us to tackle the challenges. Then
Section 1.3 briefly outlines the contributions of this dissertation. And Section 1.4
outlines the organization of the dissertation.
1.1 The Challenges
Byzantine fault tolerance was invented in the late ’70s,1 when NASA initiated a
project to build computers that are reliable enough to fly aircraft [131]. Today
Byzantine fault tolerance continues to be used in flying aircraft and space shut-
tles [45], but it also finds new application in distributed applications. As men-
tioned earlier, distributed applications that implement online services could
scale to millions of users. When a distributed application scales up, it suffers
from increasingly frequent and complex failures due to the increased system
and code sizes, respectively. Studies (e.g., [100, 55, 79, 122]) have shown that
most failures exhibit behavior that is more complicated than halting (a.k.a. crash
failures). Spontaneous bit flips, disk and memory corruptions, misconfigura-
tions, Heisenbugs [78], and malicious compromise are examples among such
failures. A scalable distributed application therefore had better tolerate failures
beyond crashes.
Yet, most fault-tolerant distributed applications deployed today (e.g., [73,
59, 66, 50, 88]) are limited to tolerating crashes. It is not that we do not know
how to build Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) distributed applications. We know
1The name Byzantine was not coined until 1982 [97].
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how to build practical scalable data stores that tolerate Byzantine failures, such
as [53, 33, 38, 130]. We know how to build BFT peer-to-peer protocols (e.g., [39,
52, 82, 87, 101]). And we also know the state machine replication approach
(SMR) [93, 121], which can be used to develop a BFT version of any deterministic
protocol or distributed application. Yet, again, no distributed application in
production tolerates Byzantine failures.
A natural question arises at this point: Why is Byzantine fault tolerance not
good enough for general distributed applications, while it has been used for
some specific applications such as aircraft control for a few decades?
We identify two challenges that impede the deployment of BFT distributed
applications in practice:
• BFT protocols are notoriously hard to design and implement correctly. Be-
cause arbitrary failures can occur, the applications need considerably more
transitions to handle all types of failures and considerably more state to
keep track of the inputs. In addition, subtle mistakes in the protocol de-
sign or in the development may leave vulnerabilities in the resulting ap-
plications. The SMR approach can help to alleviate this difficulty, but it
will incur prohibitive costs.
• BFT systems implemented by the SMR approach have cost-of-ownership
much higher than that of crash-tolerant systems. The costs come from two
sources: replication and computation.
– Replication: In an asynchronous environment, both crash-tolerant
and BFT systems use the SMR approach. But BFT systems require t
more replicas to tolerate t failures. In a synchronous environment,
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crash-tolerant systems can leverage the primary-backup approach
and save 2t more replicas than BFT systems.2
– Computation: BFT protocols require some cryptographic primitives
such as HMAC [92] and/or RSA [120] that are necessarily compu-
tationally expensive in order to prevent brute-force attacks that try
to forge invalid messages. Furthermore, BFT protocols exchange
more messages than crash-tolerant protocols. When comparing with
primary-backup protocols, BFT protocols exchange a quadratic num-
ber (in t, the maximum number of failures that can be tolerated)
of messages to order inputs in the worst case [67], while primary-
backup protocols only exchange a linear number of messages w.r.t.
t. The performance of BFT protocols is thus lower than their crash-
tolerant counterparts, as BFT protocols exchange more messages, and
each message takes a longer time to process.
The two challenges are not large concerns in the original use of Byzantine
fault tolerance. First, there are only a small number of applications running in
an aircraft control system. Second, the applications running in an aircraft con-
trol system are small scale. And so, the cost-of-ownership of such applications
is manageable. Distributed applications that implement online services, in con-
trast, could scale to millions of users. Their scales amplify the challenges above.
In this dissertation we will tackle these two challenges.
2In a synchronous environment, BFT systems can trade low CPU consumption for low repli-
cation cost by using digital signatures. Authenticated BFT systems only require t+1 replicas in
a synchronous environment.
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Figure 1.1: A Fault-Tolerance Substrate.
1.2 Our Approach
This section informally presents our approach toward fault tolerant distributed
applications. We start with informally describing a model of such systems.
A distributed system comprises a set of application processes that implement
a distributed application and a set of client processes that use the application.
Each application process implements a deterministic state machine.3 The pro-
cesses communicate with one another by passing messages over a fault-tolerance
substrate.
A fault-tolerance substrate comprises a communication network that transmits
messages, a stable storage module that keeps data retrievable even when fail-
ures occur, a notary service that certifies messages not being forged by faulty
3Non-determinism, such as random values and clock values, can be modeled as inputs to
deterministic transitions.
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processes, and a set of surrogates that are replicas of the processes. Figure 1.1
illustrates the model.
When a client or an application process wants to send a request to another
application process, it first uses the notary service to convert the request to a self-
verifiable request. A self-verifiable request can by itself convince a receiver that
it is not forged by a faulty process. We call such messages valid—a more formal
definition follows in Chapters 3 and 5. When a process receives a request, it also
uses the notary service to verify the request’s validity.
When an application process receives and successfully verifies a request, it
can execute the request and send outputs upon a condition: the distributed ap-
plication sends outputs to the clients only when its causal past has been stored
in stable storage. Stable storage stores self-verifiable data, such as messages,
checkpoints, or incremental state changes. Stable storage preserves two invari-
ants: (1) if a piece of data has been stored and has not been deleted, it will be
retrievable; and (2) it is always possible to list the data that have been stored
and have not been deleted.
Surrogates are optional in our model. When a distributed application needs
to mask failures without interruption to the normal operation, a set of surro-
gates are associated with each application process. Surrogates monitor the sta-
ble storage for updates, verify the updates using the notary service, and apply
the updates to bring themselves up-to-date with the application process. Surro-
gates can actively participate in the normal operation of the application, or sit
passively as backups for the application process.
By modeling a distributed system this way, we can add, remove, and op-
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timize each module separately. This flexibility is the key we use to tackle the
challenges described in the previous section.
1.3 Contributions of the Dissertation
The dissertation presents a novel approach to fault tolerance, which separates
the concerns in fault tolerance in a new way. The approach leads to two main
concrete contributions:
• A translation approach that can be used to transform any crash-tolerant
distributed applications to Byzantine-tolerant ones. We present two ver-
sions of the approach. The basic one is helpful in designing new BFT pro-
tocols based on existing crash-tolerant protocols, but it does not scale. The
scalable version is applicable to large-scale distributed applications.
• An affordable replication protocol that leverages an external configuration
service to use t+ 1 replicas to tolerate t Byzantine failures. We present two
variations of the protocol. The variations show a tradeoff between the
assumptions we make about the adversary and the costs.
We also contribute the following building blocks:
• An ordered broadcast protocol that guarantees that the correct receivers
will receive the broadcast messages in the same order, even when the
sender is malicious.
• A credit-based flow control protocol that forces the replicated state ma-
chines to process inputs fairly or halt.
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• An illustration of how to apply the basic translation approach to derive a
BFT protocol from a crash-tolerant one. We derive the PBFT protocol [53]
from the Viewstamped Replication protocol [115].
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives an overview of the
related background and puts the dissertation into context. Chapter 3 presents
the basic version of our translation approach. Chapter 4 presents the scalable
version of our translation approach and its evaluation. Chapter 5 presents the
affordable replication protocol and its evaluation. Finally Chapter 6 concludes
the dissertation with discussion of future directions.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The literature contains a rich body of work on fault tolerance. Some approaches
are general enough to provide fault tolerance to many types of distributed appli-
cations, while others target specific applications such as data storage and mes-
sage transmission. In this chapter we first discuss well-known fault tolerance
approaches and map them to our model. Then we discuss related work on tech-
niques that automatically strengthen distributed protocols and systems. And
finally, we discuss related work on techniques that reduce replication costs in
fault tolerant systems.
2.1 Fault-Tolerance Approaches
General fault tolerance approaches, when mapped to our model, implement
one, two, or all three components in the fault tolerance substrate (all but the
communication network). Their fault tolerance capability and performance de-
pends on what they implement.
The rollback recovery approaches (R/R) such as message logging and check-
pointing [69] assume the existence of stable storage and optionally employ a no-
tary service [34], but do not have surrogates. Application processes save state
and/or messages in stable storage while running. When an application process
crashes, a new one loads the state and messages from stable storage and recover
the system to a consistent state. Since there are no surrogates, these approaches
can take considerable time to recover from failures.
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The primary-backup approach (P/B) [37, 49] models each application pro-
cess as a primary and implements stable storage that stores the state of the pri-
mary using t backups. The t backups also serve as surrogates, which can take
over from the primary when it fails. The only component missing in the P/B
approach is a notary service. Similar to R/R approaches, the absence of a no-
tary service helps the P/B approach to incur low overhead in normal runs, but
prevents it from tolerating Byzantine failures. Unlike R/R approaches, the P/B
approach recovers quickly from failures, because the surrogates (backups) are
kept up-to-date with the primary.
R/R and P/B approaches rely on synchrony conditions to decide when to
replace an application process by a new one (in R/R) or by a surrogate (in P/B).
These approaches use ad-hoc methods to handle failure detection mistakes hap-
pening when the synchrony conditions are violated.
The state machine replication approaches (SMR) [93, 121] work in both syn-
chronous and asynchronous environments. SMR replicates each application
process to implement the stable storage abstraction, the surrogates, and, in the
case of Byzantine fault tolerance, the notary service abstraction. There are two
variations of SMR: symmetric and leader-based. The two variations share the
same characteristics that (1) messages rather than state are stored in stable stor-
age, and (2) replicas actively execute the messages to bring themselves up-to-
date.
Symmetric SMR protocols such as those using randomization [42] employ
replicas that play the same role. Such protocols make no distinction between the
application process and its surrogates. And so they can mask failures without
interrupting the application execution. However, because the replicas in SMR
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need to agree on the order of the input messages in order to implement the
stable storage abstraction, the symmetry of the replicas incur higher overhead
than P/B in normal runs to order the inputs.
Leader-based SMR protocols such as [94, 95, 58] are similar to P/B in that
they designate a replica to act as the leader. The leader plays the role of the ap-
plication process, while the others play the role of surrogates. Thus leader-based
SMR protocols are similar to P/B in that they incur low overhead in normal runs
and require a quick recovery to overcome leader failures (in contrast to masking
failures on the fly as in symmetric protocols).
Some other approaches in the literature are not originally designed for gen-
eral fault tolerant distributed applications, but can be used to build all or part
of a fault tolerant distributed application.
The transaction processing approach (T/P) [127, 75, 77] is designed to main-
tain a consistent state when executing transactions in distributed databases.
Each participant in a transaction can execute multiple operations, and the oper-
ations may differ among the participants. When we treat the execution of each
input as a transaction, T/P can be used to implement fault tolerant distributed
applications. More specifically, we can replicate each application process, and
designate one replica to serve as the coordinator. Input messages are submitted
to the coordinator, which coordinates the replicas to handle each input message
as a transaction. When putting this into our model, the replicas implement the
stable storage abstraction. Similar to R/R, T/P leverage stable storage to toler-
ate failures. But since T/P does not employ surrogates and notary services, it
does not tolerate Byzantine failures and takes considerable time to recover from
failures.
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The quorum system approach (Q/S) [84, 104, 32] implements a fault tolerant
variable by maintaining multiple copies of the variable. Each operation on the
variable is applied to a large-enough quorum of replicas and brings the replicas
to the same state. But in contrast to SMR, the replicas in Q/S are not required to
go through the same sequence of operations. This approach implements stable
storage. And when the stable storage is used to store the application state, Q/S
can implement fault tolerant distributed applications. Fault tolerant distributed
applications based on Q/S can mask failures and can tolerate Byzantine failures
if they also implement surrogates and a notary service. The difference in the
number of replicas and the size of the quorum determines the number of surro-
gates used. Q/S masks failures until there is no surrogate left. A notary service
can be implemented in Q/S by using a larger number of replicas and a larger
quorum size, and/or by using cryptographic primitives.
Various works in coding theory such as CRC checksum [118], hashed mes-
sage authentication codes (HMAC) [92], RSA digital signatures [120] enable
data integrity verification and can be used to implement a notary service under
different adversarial strengths. In a Byzantine environment (strong adversary),
these techniques can be used only for authentication but not for message va-
lidity verification. Malicious processes can forge invalid messages with valid
signatures. Such hostile environments require stronger methods for building a
notary service. Examples are using replicas along with digital signature, and
using proof-carrying data [61].
Table 2.1 summarizes the approaches for fault tolerant distributed applica-
tions.
By separating fault tolerance concerns from applications, we are able to ma-
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Notary Service Surrogates Approaches
No No R/R, T/P
No Yes P/B, SMR, Q/S
Yes No BFT R/R, Shuttle (Chapter 5)
Yes Yes BFT SMR, BFT Q/S
Table 2.1: General approaches for fault tolerant distributed applications.
All these approaches require stable storage.
nipulate the concerns in isolation. In particular, our translation and replication
approaches were resulted from exploring how to lower the costs of Byzantine
fault tolerance (BFT):
• our translation approach lowers developmental costs of BFT applications
by leveraging the existing fault tolerance capability of crash-tolerant ap-
plications and only implementing the missing notary service;
• our replication approach lowers the operational costs of BFT applications
by eliminating the surrogates in BFT applications and reduce the number
of replicas to t+ 1 for t Byzantine faults.
Below we discuss related work on the two approaches.
2.2 Translation Techniques
The idea of automatically translating crash-tolerant systems into BFT systems
can be traced back to the mid-eighties. Gabriel Bracha presents a translation
mechanism that transforms a protocol tolerant of up to t crash failures into
one that tolerates t Byzantine failures [46]. Brian Coan also presents a trans-
lation [64] that is similar to Bracha’s. These approaches have two important
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restrictions. One is that input protocols are required to have a specific style of
execution, and in particular they have to be round-based with each participant
awaiting the receipt of n − t messages before starting a new round. Second,
the approaches have quadratic message overheads and as a result do not scale
well. Note that these approaches were primarily intended for a certain class of
consensus protocols, while we are pursuing arbitrary protocols and distributed
systems.
Toueg, Neiger and Bazzi worked on an extension of Bracha’s and Coan’s
approaches for translation of synchronous systems [40, 41, 111]. Mpoeleng et
al. [109] present a scalable translation that is also intended for synchronous sys-
tems, and transforms Byzantine faults to so-called signal-on-failure faults. They
replace each host with a pair, and assume only one of the hosts in each pair may
fail. In the Internet, making synchrony assumptions is dangerous. Byzantine
hosts can easily trigger violations of such assumptions to attack the system.
Our translation approach makes fewer assumptions about the distributed
applications than previous ones and can be applied to any deterministic dis-
tributed applications. In particular, our translation does not require the dis-
tributed applications to have any form. Furthermore, it is not based on time
bounds and consensus to be correct and, hence, applicable to asynchronous dis-
tributed applications. Yet for each application message the translation termi-
nates in a constant number of communication steps. Hence when synchrony is
present, it is time bounded and applicable to synchronous distributed applica-
tions as well. Finally, the scalable version of our translation only incurs linear
message overhead and scale well with the size of a distributed application.
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2.3 Cost Reduction Approaches
In practice, Byzantine replication is used exclusively in synchronous environ-
ments [97], although there has been a large body of research on Byzantine repli-
cation in asynchronous or partially synchronous environments as well. One of
the first systems to consider asynchronous Byzantine replication for practical
deployment is PBFT [53], which demonstrates the practicality of a BFT version
of NFS [113]. PBFT exploits HMACs for increased performance, but the cost in
terms of hardware is high, requiring 3t+ 1 hosts to tolerate t Byzantine failures.
Various approaches have since tried to lower this cost.
A notable series of optimization follows the principle of separation of con-
cerns. [134] separates agreement from execution and observes that it is not nec-
essary to have 3t + 1 full replicas. The authors suggest a model with 2t + 1
execution nodes (similar to replicas) and 3t + 1 agreement nodes (inexpensive ma-
chines, similar to witnesses), where an agreement node can co-locate with an
execution node—resulting in a total cost of 2t+ 1 full replicas and t inexpensive
machines. UpRight Cluster Services [62], on the other hand, distinguishes mali-
cious failures from crashes and assumes that crashes occur more often while it is
cheaper to tolerate. The authors apply a hybrid model [96] to practical settings.
The model requires 2u+ r replicas (or u+ r + 1 replicas and u witnesses) to tol-
erate u failures, among which at most r are malicious. When malicious failures
are rarer than crashes (r ≤ u), the hybrid model results in a lower replication
cost.
ZZ [132] further optimizes [134] by noticing that replicas can be turned off
and treated as “slow” in normal runs. To tolerate t Byzantine failures, a ZZ
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system employs t + 1 execution nodes (replicas) and 3t + 1 agreement nodes in
normal runs. When failures occur, ZZ wakes up the other replicas, which are on
hibernated virtual machines. ZZ demonstrates that on-demand state transfer
makes the approach practical.
It is also possible to weaken consistency guarantees to lower costs. For exam-
ple, [102] allows 2t out of 3t+ 1 hosts to fail, but the system does not guarantee
linearizable behavior [85] in that case. The behavior is linearizable if and only if
at most t hosts fail.
Yet another approach to lower cost is to add self-checking to crash-tolerant
systems, in order to achieve fault tolerance to a greater class of failures than
just crashes. For example, in Paxos Made Live [56] the authors use checksums
to verify the integrity of a disk-based log in their Chubby [50] implementation.
This implementation uses 2t+ 1 replicas for t failures.
Our affordable replication approach, called Shuttle, reduces the replication
cost by relying on an external configuration service for liveness when failures
occur. The Shuttle protocol uses only t + 1 replicas and t witnesses to make
progress when failures do not occur while preserving safety against up to t
Byzantine failures. However, when it is possible to make a stronger assump-
tion about the adversary, we can eliminate witnesses and use t+1 replicas alone
to preserve safety. With the stronger assumption, we can use a cheaper crypto-
graphic primitive and reduce the computational cost of the protocol.
Even though Shuttle shares some mechanisms with Byzantine checkpoint-
ing [34], such as using t + 1 replicas when there are no failures and relying on
an external service when failures occur, they are fundamentally different. The
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Byzantine checkpointing approach aims for scientific computation, where it is
acceptable to roll back a computation. Shuttle never rolls back. It aims for dis-
tributed applications running on the cloud environment.
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CHAPTER 3
STRENGTHENING CRASH-TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED APPLICATIONS
Distributed applications have to deal with failures, because failures are com-
mon when a distributed application runs on multiple machines. Dealing with
failures makes developing distributed applications difficult, especially when
the environment is asynchronous and failed machines may exhibit arbitrary be-
havior. Yet, this is a problem that many software developers face today. While
we know how to build replicated data stores that tolerate Byzantine behavior
(e.g., [53]), most applications go well beyond providing a data store. Tools like
Byzantine consensus may help developing such applications, but most software
developers find BFT is extremely challenging. Instead, they often make simpli-
fying assumptions like a crash failure model, relying on careful monitoring to
detect and fix problems that occur when such assumptions are violated.
Because most distributed applications already tolerate crash failures, can we
leverage their existing fault tolerance capability to simplify the developing of
Byzantine fault tolerance? This question intrigued us to study techniques that
automatically transform crash-tolerant distributed applications into BFT ones
that do not require careful monitoring and repair.
We develop such a technique in this chapter and make the following contri-
butions. First we present a novel ordered broadcast protocol that we will use as
a building block. The protocol is an extension of the Srikanth and Toueg authen-
ticated broadcast protocol often used in Byzantine consensus protocols [124],
adding consistent ordering for messages from the same sender even in the
face of Byzantine behavior. Second, we present a new way of translating a
distributed application that is tolerant of crash failures into one that tolerates
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the same number of Byzantine failures, while imposing fewer restrictions on
how the application is constructed than previous approaches. Third, we show
how a version of the Castro and Liskov Practical Byzantine Replication proto-
col [53] can be derived from the Oki and Liskov Viewstamped Replication proto-
col [115] using our translation technique, something not possible with previous
approaches.
We describe a system model in Section 3.1 and introduce three mechanisms
used for translation: Authenticated Reliable broadcast (Section 3.2), Ordered
Authenticast Reliable broadcast (Section 3.3), and the translation mechanism
itself (Section 3.4). In Section 3.5 we demonstrate the translation mechanism.
3.1 System Model
In order to be precise we present a simple model to talk about machines, pro-
cesses, and networks. The model consists of agents and links. An agent is an ac-
tive entity that maintains state, receives messages on incoming links, performs
some processing based on this input and its state, possibly updating its state
and producing output messages on outgoing links.
Links are abstract unidirectional FIFO channels between two agents. Agents
can interact across links only. In particular, an agent can enqueue a message on
one of its outgoing links, and it can dequeue messages from one of its incoming
links (assuming a message is available there).
We use agents and links to model various activities and interactions. Pro-
cesses that run on hosts are agents, but the network is also an agent—one that
forwards messages from its incoming links to its outgoing links according to
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Figure 3.1: An agent model and a refinement.
some policy. Agents are named by lower-case Greek letters α, β, .... For agents
that are processes, we will use subscripts on names to denote which hosts they
run on. For example, βi is an agent that runs on host hi.
Hosts are containers for agents, and they are also the unit of failure. Hosts
are either honest, executing programs as specified, or Byzantine [97], exhibiting
arbitrary behavior. We also use the terms correct and faulty, but not as alterna-
tives to honest and Byzantine. A correct host is honest and always eventually
makes progress when it is given an input. A faulty host is a Byzantine host or
an honest host that has crashed or will eventually crash. Honest and Byzantine
are mutually exclusive, as are correct and faulty. However, a host can be both
honest and faulty.
We do not assume timing bounds on execution of agents. Latency in the net-
work is modeled as execution delay in a network agent. Note that this prevents
hosts from accurately detecting crashes of other hosts.
Figure 3.1 depicts an example of an agent model and a refinement. Agents
are represented by circles, links by arrows, and hosts by rectangles. The top
half models two application agents β1 and β2 running on two hosts h1 and h2
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communicating using a FIFO network agent φ. The bottom half refines the FIFO
network using an unreliable network agent ν and two protocol agents φS1 and φR2
that implement ordering and retransmission using sequence numbers, timers,
and acknowledgment messages. This kind of refinement will be a common
theme throughout this chapter.
3.2 The ARcast Mechanism
The first mechanism we present is Authenticated Reliable broadcast (ARcast).
This broadcast mechanism was suggested by Srikanth and Toueg, and they
present an implementation that does not require public-key digital signatures
in [124]. Their implementation requires n > 3t. As shown below, it is also pos-
sible to develop an implementation that uses public-key digital signatures, in
which case n only has to be larger than 2t.
3.2.1 ARcast Definition
Assume βi, ... are agents communicating using ARcast on hosts hi, .... Then AR-
cast provides the following properties:
1. bc-Persistence. If two hosts hi and hj are correct, and βi sends a message m,
then βj delivers m from βi;
2. bc-Relay. If hi is honest and hj is correct, and βi delivers m from βk, then βj
delivers m from βk (host hk is not necessarily correct);
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3. bc-Authenticity. If two hosts hi and hj are honest and βi does not send m,
then βj does not deliver m from βi.
Informally, ARcast ensures that a message is reliably delivered to all correct
receivers in case the sender is correct (bc-Persistence) or in case another honest
receiver has delivered the message already (bc-Relay). Moreover, a Byzantine
host cannot forge messages from an honest host (bc-Authenticity).
3.2.2 ARcast Implementation
We assume there is a single sender βi on hi. We model ARcast as a network agent
ξi, which we refine by replacing it with the following agents (see Figure 3.2):
Figure 3.2: Architecture of the ARcast implementation if the sender is on
host hi.
ξSi sender agent that is in charge of the sending side of the ARcast mechanism;
ξR∗ receiver agents that are in charge of the receive side;
φ FIFO network agent that provides point-to-point authenticated FIFO com-
munication between agents.
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The mechanism has to be instantiated for each sender. The sending host hi
runs the ARcast sender agent ξSi . Each receiving host hj runs a receiver agent ξRj .
There have to be at least 2t+ 1 receiving hosts, one of which may be hi. When ξSi
wants to ARcast a message m, it sends 〈echom, i〉i, signed by hi using its public
key signature, to all receivers. A receiver that receives such an echo message
for the first time forwards it to all receivers. On receipt of t+ 1 of these correctly
signed echoes for the same m from different receivers (it can count an echo from
itself), a receiver delivers m from i.
3.2.3 ARcast Correctness
Theorem 3.2.1. ARcast satisfies bc-Persistence.
Proof. Assume hi and hj are correct, and say sender ξSi sends mi. Because hi
is correct, all correct receivers receive 〈echo m, i〉i from ξSi . Because there are at
least 2t + 1 receivers, at least t + 1 of the receivers must be correct. As all these
receivers send an echo message to ξRj , ξRj will receive at least t + 1 copies and
deliver m from ξRi .
Theorem 3.2.2. ARcast satisfies bc-Authenticity.
Proof. Enforced using the digital signature on the echo message sent by the
honest sender.
Theorem 3.2.3. ARcast satisfies bc-Relay.
Proof. Say hj is honest and receiver ξRj deliversm from ξSi . Because ξRj awaited t+
1 echoes form, at least one of the echoes must have come from a correct receiver.
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As this correct receiver sends a copy to all receivers, all correct receivers obtain
a copy and will forward the message if they have not done so already. There
are at least t+ 1 correct receivers, and therefore each correct receiver eventually
receives at least t+ 1 echoes, and delivers the message.
3.3 The OARcast Mechanism
ARcast does not provide any ordering. Even messages from a correct sender
may be delivered in different orders at different receivers. Next we introduce a
broadcast mechanism that is like ARcast, but adds delivery order for messages
sent by either honest or Byzantine hosts.
3.3.1 OARcast Definition
OARcast provides, in addition to the ARcast properties, the following:
4. bc-FIFO. If two hosts hi and hj are honest and βi sends m1 before m2, and
βj delivers m1 and m2 from βi, then βj delivers m1 before m2;
5. bc-Ordering. If two hosts hi and hj are honest and βi and βj both deliver
m1 from βk and m2 from βk, then they do so in the same order (even if hk
is Byzantine).
As a result of bc-Ordering, even a Byzantine sender cannot cause two honest
receivers to deliver OARcast messages from the same source out of order. bc-
FIFO ensures that messages from honest hosts are delivered in the order sent.
24
OARcast does not guarantee any order among messages from different sources,
and is thus weaker than consensus.
3.3.2 OARcast Implementation
Figure 3.3: Architecture of the OARcast implementation if the sender is
on host hi.
We describe how OARcast may be implemented using ARcast. Again, we
show the implementation for a single sender βi on host hi. With multiple
senders, the implementation has to be instantiated for each sender separately.
We refine the OARcast network agent ωi by replacing it with the following
agents (see Figure 3.3):
ωSi sender agent that is in charge of the sending side of the OARcast mecha-
nism;
ωO∗ orderer agents that are in charge of ordering;
ωR∗ receiver agents that are in charge of the receive side;
φ FIFO network agent that provides point-to-point authenticated FIFO com-
munication from the sender agent to each orderer agent;
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ξ∗ ARcast network agents each provides ARcast from a particular orderer
agent to all receiver agents.
We need to run 3t + 1 orderers on separate hosts, of which no more than t
may fail. A host may end up running a sender, a receiver, as well as an orderer.
A receiver ωRj maintains a sequence number cj , initially 0. An orderer ωOk also
maintains a sequence number, tk, initially 0.
To OARcast a message m, ωSi sends m to each orderer via φ. When an orderer
ωOk receives m from ω
S
i , it ARcasts 〈order m, tk, i〉 to each of the receivers, and
increments tk. A receiver ωRj awaits 2t+ 1 messages 〈orderm, cj, i〉 from different
orderers before delivering m from ωSi . After doing so, the receiver increments cj .
3.3.3 OARcast Correctness
Lemma 3.3.1. Say hi and hj are honest and m is the cth message that ωRj delivers from
ωSi , then m is the cth message that ωSi sent.
Proof. Say m is not the cth message sent by ωSi , but it is the cth message delivered
by ωRj . ωRj must have received 2t+ 1 messages of the form 〈orderm, c− 1, i〉 from
different orderers. Because only t hosts may fail, and because of bc-Authenticity
of ARcast, at least one of the order messages comes from a correct orderer. Be-
cause communication between ωSi and this orderer is FIFO, and because the
sender does not send m as its cth message, it is not possible that the orderer
sent 〈order m, c− 1, i〉.
Lemma 3.3.2. Say m is the cth message that a correct sender ωSi sends. Then all correct
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receivers receive at least 2t + 1 messages of the form 〈order m, c − 1, i〉 from different
orderers.
Proof. Because the sender is correct, each of the correct orderers will deliver m.
As all links are FIFO and m is the cth message, it is clear that for each orderer
ωOk , tk = c− 1. Each correct orderer ωOk therefore sends 〈orderm, c− 1, i〉 to all re-
ceivers. Because at least 2t+1 of the orderers are correct, and because of ARcast’s
bc-Persistence, each correct receiver receives 2t+ 1 such order messages.
Theorem 3.3.3. OARcast satisfies bc-Persistence.
Proof. Assume the sending host, hi, is correct, and consider a correct receiving
host hj . The proof proceeds by induction on c, the number of messages sent by
ωSi . Consider the first message m sent by ωSi . By Lemma 3.3.2, ωRj receives 2t + 1
messages of the form 〈order m, 0, i〉. By Lemma 3.3.1 it is not possible that the
first message that ωRj delivers is a message other than m. Therefore, cj = 0 when
ωRj receives the order messages for m and will deliver m.
Now assume that bc-Persistence holds for the first c messages from ωSi .
We show that bc-Persistence holds for the (c + 1)st message sent by ωSi . By
Lemma 3.3.2, ωRj receives 2t + 1 messages of the form 〈order m, c, i〉. By the
induction hypothesis, ωRj will increment cj at least up to c. By Lemma 3.3.1 it
is not possible that the cth message that ωRj delivers is a message other than m.
Therefore, cj = c when ωRj receives the order messages for m and will deliver
m.
Theorem 3.3.4. OARcast satisfies bc-Authenticity.
Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Lemma 3.3.1.
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Theorem 3.3.5. OARcast satisfies bc-Relay.
Proof. By induction on the sequence number. Say some correct receiver ωRj de-
livers the first message m from ωSi . By the OARcast protocol, ωRj must have
received 2t+ 1 messages of the form 〈orderm, 0, i〉 from different orderers when
cj = 0. Because of the bc-Relay property of ARcast, all correct receivers receive
the same order messages from the orderers. By Lemma 3.3.1 it is not possible
that a correct receiver ωRj′ delivered a message other thanm, and therefore cj′ = 0
when ωRj′ receives the order messages. Thus ω
R
j′ will also deliver m.
Now assume the theorem holds for the first c messages sent by ωSi . Say some
correct receiver ωRj delivers the (c + 1)st message m from ωSi . By the OARcast
protocol, ωRj must have received 2t + 1 messages of the form 〈order m, c, i〉 from
different orderers when cj = c. Because of the bc-Relay property of ARcast, all
correct receivers receive the same order messages from the orderers. Because
of the induction hypothesis, the correct receivers deliver the first c messages.
By Lemma 3.3.1 it is not possible that a correct receiver ωRj′ delivered a mes-
sage other than m, and therefore cj = c when ωRj′ receives the order messages
containing m. Thus ωRj′ will also deliver m.
Lemma 3.3.6. Saym is the cth message that an honest receiver ωRj delivers from ωSi , and
m′ is the cth message that another honest receiver ωRj′ delivers from ω
S
i . Then m = m′
(even if hi is Byzantine).
Proof. Say not. ωRj must have received 2t + 1 messages of the form 〈order m, c−
1, i〉1 from different orderers, while ωRj′ must have received 2t+1 messages of the
form 〈orderm′, c− 1, i〉 from different orderers. As there are only 3t+ 1 orderers,
1Note that the counters start from 0. 〈order m, c − 1, i〉 means m is the cth message being
ordered.
28
at least one correct orderer must have sent one of each, which is impossible as
correct orderers increment their sequence numbers for each new message.
Theorem 3.3.7. OARcast satisfies bc-Ordering.
Proof. Corollary of Lemma 3.3.6.
Theorem 3.3.8. OARcast satisfies bc-FIFO.
Proof. Evident from the FIFOness of messages from senders to orderers and the
sequence numbers utilized by orderers and receivers.
3.4 The Translation Mechanism
In this section, we describe how an arbitrary protocol tolerant only of crash fail-
ures can be translated into a protocol that tolerates Byzantine failures.
3.4.1 Definition
Below we use the terms original and translated to distinguish the system before
and after translation, respectively. The original system tolerates only crash fail-
ures, while the translated system tolerates Byzantine failures as well. The orig-
inal system consists of n hosts, each of which runs an actor agent, α1, . . . , αn.
Each actor αi is a state machine that maintains a running state si, initially si0,
and, upon receiving an input message m, executes a deterministic state transi-
tion function F i: (mo, sic+1) := F i(m, sic) where
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• c indicates the number of messages that αi has processed so far;
• sic is the state of αi before processing m;
• sic+1 is the next state of sic as a result of processing m (called
F i(m, sic).next);
• mo is a finite, possibly empty set of output messages (called
F i(m, sic).output).
The state transition functions process one input message at a time and may have
no computational time bound.
Actors in the original system communicate via a FIFO network agent φ. Each
actor maintains a pair of input-output links with the FIFO network agent. When
an actor αi wants to send a message m to another actor αj (may be itself), αi
formats m (detailed below) and enqueues it on αi’s output link. We call this
action αi sendsm to αj . φ dequeuesm from the link and places it into the message
buffer that φ maintains. Eventually φ removes m from its buffer and enqueues
m on the input link of αj . When αj dequeues m we say that αj delivers m from
αi. The original system assumes the following of the network:
1. α-Persistence. If two hosts hi and hj are correct and αi sends m to αj , then
αj delivers m from αi.
2. α-Authenticity. If two hosts hi and hj are honest and αi does not send m to
αj , then αj does not deliver m from αi.
3. α-FIFO. If two hosts hi and hj are honest and αi sends m1 before m2, and
αj delivers m1 and m2 from αi, then αj delivers m1 before m2;
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Note that in the original system all hosts are honest. However, for the trans-
lation we need to be able to generalize these properties to include Byzantine
hosts.
Messages in the original system are categorized as internal or external. In-
ternal messages are sent between actors and are formatted as 〈d, i, j〉, where d is
the data (or payload), i indicates the source actor, and j indicates the destination
actor. External messages are from clients to actors and are formatted as 〈d,⊥, j〉,
similar to the format of internal messages except the source actor is empty (⊥).
Internal and external messages are in general called α-messages, or simply mes-
sages when the context is clear.
In the original system all actors produce output messages by making transi-
tions based on input as specified by the protocol. We call such output messages
valid. We formalize validity below.
External messages are assumed to be valid. For example, we may require
that clients sign messages. An internal message m sent by actor αi is valid if
and only if there exists a sequence of valid messages mi1, . . . ,mic delivered by αi
such that
m ∈ F i(mic, F i(mic−1, F i(. . . , F i(mi1, si0).next . . .).next).next).output
The expression means that actor αi sends m after it has processed the first c
input messages, be they internal or external. Note that external input forms the
base case for this recursive definition, as actors produce no internal messages
until at least one delivers an external message.2
2We model periodic processing not based on input by external timer messages.
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Figure 3.4: Translation: the original system (left) is simulated at each host
in the translated system (right). Dark circles are master actors.
Dashed lines represent OARcast communication.
In order for the original system to work correctly, each actor needs to make
transitions based on valid input. More formally, the system needs to preserve
the following property:
4. α-Validity. If hi is honest and αi delivers m from αj , then m is valid.
The property is granted to the original system by default, because it is in an
environment where faulty hosts follow the protocol faithfully until they crash.
Besides the four α–properties, the original system requires no other assump-
tions about communication among actors. However, the original system may
require non-communication assumptions such as “up to t hosts can fail.”
The Translation mechanism transforms a crash-tolerant system in which all
hosts require the four α-properties into a Byzantine-tolerant system that pre-
serves the α-properties.
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3.4.2 Implementation
In the original system, each actor αi runs on a separate host hi. In the translated
system each host simulates the entire original system (see Fig. 3.4). That is, a
host runs a replica of each of the n actors and passes messages between the
actors internally using a simulated network agent, called coordinator, that runs
on the host. We denote the coordinator running on host hi as κi.
Figure 3.5: Anatomy of host hi in the translated system.
To ensure that the different hosts stay synchronized, the coordinators agree
on the order in which messages are delivered to replicas of the same actor. The
replica of αi on host hj is called αij . We designate αii as the master replica and αij
(i 6= j) as slave replicas. On honest hosts, the replicas of each actor start in the
same initial state.
Each coordinator replaces φ of the original system by OARcast, i.e., OARcast
is used to send messages. OARcast guarantees that coordinators agree on the
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// Message from external client
On receipt of msg m = 〈x,⊥, i〉:
αii.deliver(m);
κi.send(〈externalm, i〉);
// Message from actor j to actor k
On αji .send(〈d, j, k〉):
if k = i then
αii.deliver(〈d, j, k〉);
κi.send(〈internal 〈d, j, i〉, i〉);
else
Bi.add(〈d, j, k〉);
// κ-message from j
On κi.deliver(〈tag m, j〉):
if j 6= i then
Qji .enqueue(m);
else
ignore m;
// Head of queue matches msg in bag
When ∃j : Qji .head() ∈ Bi:
m = Qji .dequeue();
Bi.remove(m);
αji .deliver(m);
// Head of message queue is external
When ∃j, d : Qji .head() = 〈d,⊥, j〉:
m = Qji .dequeue();
αji .deliver(m);
Figure 3.6: Pseudo-code of the Translation Mechanism for coordinator κi.
When an actor delivers a message m, it also processes m and
produces outputs atomically.
delivery of messages to replicas of a particular actor. Coordinators wrap each α-
message in a κ-message. κ-messages have the form 〈tag m, i〉, where tag is either
internal or external, m is an α-message, and i indicates the destination actor.
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Each coordinator maintains an unordered message bag and n per-actor-replica
message queues. By Bi we denote the message bag at host i and by Q
j
i we denote
the message queue for actor αji at host i (see Figure 3.5). The pseudo-code for
a coordinator κi appears in Figure 3.6. κi intercepts messages from local actors,
and it receives messages from remote coordinators. κi places α-messages sent
by local actor replicas in Bi, and places α-messages received within κ-messages
from κj in Q
j
i . When there is a match between a message m in the bag and the
head of a queue, the coordinator enqueues m for the corresponding actor.
The translated system guarantees α-Persistence, α-Authenticity, α-FIFO, and
α-Validity to all master actors on honest hosts. The next subsection contains a
proof of correctness.
3.4.3 Correctness
We prove correctness of the Translation mechanism assuming the bc-properties.
In particular, we show that the collection of coordinators and slave replicas
that use the Translation mechanism preserves the α-properties: α-Persistence,
α-Authenticity, α-FIFO, and α-Validity, for the master replicas {αii}.
For convenience, we combine bc-Relay and bc-Ordering to state that coordi-
nators on correct hosts deliver the same sequence of κ-messages from any κk,
even if hk is Byzantine. This is put more formally in the following lemma:
Lemma 3.4.1. For any i, j, and k, if hi and hj are correct, then κi and κj deliver the
same sequence of messages from κk.
Proof. bc-Relay guarantees that κi and κj deliver the same set of messages from
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κk. bc-Ordering further guarantees that the delivery order between any two
messages is the same at both κi and κj .
In the proof we need to be able to compare states of hosts. We represent the
state of host hi by a vector of counters, Φi = (c1i , . . . , cni ), where each cki is the
number of messages that (the local) actor αki has delivered. As shown below,
within an execution of the protocol, replicas of the same actor deliver the same
sequence of messages. Thus from cki and ckj we can compare progress of replicas
of αk on hosts hi and hj .
Lemma 3.4.2. Given are that hosts hi and hj are correct, αki delivers m1, . . . ,mc, and
αkj delivers c′ ≤ c messages. Then the messages that αkj delivers are m1, . . . ,mc′ .
Proof. By the Translation mechanism, the first c′ messages that αki and αkj deliver
are the contents of the first c′ κ-messages that κi and κj delivered from κk, resp.
By Lemma 3.4.1, the two κ-message sequences are identical. This and the fact
that links from coordinators to actors are FIFO imply that the first c′ messages
that αki and αkj deliver are identical.
In the remaining proof we use the following definitions and notations:
• hi reaches Φ = (c1, . . . , cn), denoted hi  Φ, if ∀j cji ≥ cj ;
• Φ = (c1, . . . , cn) precedes Φ′ = (c′1, . . . , c′n), denoted Φ < Φ′, if (∀i ci ≤ c′i) ∧
(∃j cj < c′j);
• Φ = (c1, . . . , cn) produces m if m ∈
⋃n
i=1
⋃ci
c=1(F
i(mic, s
i
c−1).output), where
mic is the cth message to αi and sic−1 is the state of αi after it processes the
first c− 1 input messages.
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Corollary 3.4.3. If Φ produces m on a correct host, Φ produces m on all correct hosts
that reach Φ.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4.2 and because replicas of the same actor start in the same
state and are deterministic, if Φ produces m on a correct host, Φ produces m on
all correct hosts that reach Φ.
We now show that if a correct host is in a particular state then all other correct
hosts will reach this state.
Lemma 3.4.4. If there is a correct host hi in state Φ, then, eventually, all correct hosts
reach Φ.
Proof. By induction on Φ. All correct hosts start in state Φ0 = (0, . . . , 0), and
∀Φ 6= Φ0 : Φ0 < Φ.
Base case: All correct hosts reach Φ0 by definition.
Inductive case: Say that correct host hi is in state Φ = (c1, . . . , cn), and the lemma
holds for all Φ′ < Φ (Induction Hypothesis). We need to show that any correct
host hj reaches Φ.
Consider the last message m that some actor replica αpi delivered. Thus, m is
the cthp message that α
p
i delivered. The state of hi prior to delivering this message
is Φ′ = (c1, . . . , cp−1, . . . , cn). It is clear that Φ′ < Φ. By the induction hypothesis
hj  Φ′.
By the Translation mechanism we know that 〈tag m, p〉 (for some tag) is the
cthp κ-message that κi delivers from κp. Lemma 3.4.1 implies that 〈tag m, p〉must
also be the cthp κ-message that κj delivers from κp. Since hj  Φ′, αpj delivers the
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first cp − 1 α-messages, and thus κj must have removed those messages from
Qpj . Consequently, m gets to the head of Q
p
j . (1)
Now there are two cases to consider. If m is external, then κj will directly
remove m from Qpj and enqueue m on the link to α
p
j . Because α
p
i delivered m
after delivering the first cp − 1 messages (from the Induction Hypothesis and
the definition of m), and αpi and α
p
j run the same function F
p, αpj will eventually
deliver m as well, and therefore hj  Φ.
Consider the case where m is internal. By definition, Φ′ = (c1, . . . , cp −
1, . . . , cn) produces m at host hi. By Corollary 3.4.3, Φ′ produces m at host hj .
Thus, eventually κj places the message in the message bag Bj . (2)
(1) and (2) provide the matching condition for κj to enqueue m on its link to
αpj . Using the same reasoning for the external message case, hj  Φ.
We can now show the communication properties.
Theorem 3.4.5. (α-Persistence.) If two hosts hi and hj are correct and αii sends m to
αj , then α
j
j delivers m from αi.
Proof. Suppose hi is in state Φi when αii sends m to αj . By Lemma 3.4.4, hj  Φi.
Thus, αij sends m to αj as well. By the Translation mechanism, κj places m in Bj
and OARcasts 〈internal m, j〉. By bc-Persistence, κj delivers 〈internal m, j〉 (from
itself) and places m on its queue Qjj . (1)
By the Translation Mechanism, each external message at the head of Qjj is
dequeued and delivered by αjj . (2)
Let us consider an internal message m′ at the head of Qjj . Since hj is correct,
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the Translation mechanism ensures that κj has delivered 〈internal m′, j〉 (the κ-
message containing m′ and from κj). bc-Authenticity ensures that κj has indeed
sent the κ-message. By the Translation mechanism, κj always puts a copy of m′
in Bj before sending 〈internalm′, j〉. Thus, m′ in Qjj matches a copy in Bj , and αjj
delivers m′. This together with (2) show that αjj delivers all internal messages in
Qjj . (3)
(1) shows that m sent by αii arrives in Q
j
j , and (3) shows that α
j
j delivers all
internal messages in Qjj . Together they show that α
j
j delivers m from αi.
Theorem 3.4.6. (α-Authenticity.) If two hosts hi and hj are honest and αii does not
send m to αj , then α
j
j does not deliver m from αi.
Proof. Assume αjj delivers m from αi, but αii did not send m to αj . By the Trans-
lation mechanism, αjj only delivers m when α
i
j sends m. There are two cases.
If i = j, we get a contradiction to the assumption that αii did not send m.
If i 6= j, note that actors do not generate outputs without inputs. There must
exists a message m′ that αij delivers right before it sends m. By the Translation
mechanism, αij (i 6= j) delivers m′ only if κj has delivered 〈internal m′, i〉. By bc-
Authenticity of OARcast, κi must have OARcast 〈internal m′, i〉. Before sending
〈internalm′, i〉, κi must have delivered m′ to αii. And therefore αii must have pro-
cessed m′ and generated outputs (including m) before κi sends 〈internal m′, i〉.
In other words, αii must have sent m, contradicting the assumption.
Theorem 3.4.7. (α-FIFO.) If two hosts hi and hj are honest, αii sends m1 before m2,
and αjj delivers m1 and m2 from αi, then α
j
j delivers m1 before m2.
Proof. Suppose that αii sendsm1 andm2 after it deliversm′1 andm′2, respectively.
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Note that m′1 and m′2 can be the same. By the Translation mechanism, κi OAR-
casts m′1 before m′2. By bc-FIFO, κj delivers m′1 before m′2. By the Translation
mechanism, κj lets αij deliver m′1 before m′2, as αii does. As the actors are deter-
ministic, αij sends m1 before m2, similar to αii. By the Translation mechanism, κj
delivers m1 and m2 to α
j
j in that order, as desired.
We introduce a lemma that helps us show α-Validity:
Lemma 3.4.8. Actor replicas on honest hosts only send valid messages.
Proof. Suppose not. Let m sent by αij be the first invalid message sent by an
actor replica on an honest host. Since hj is honest, there must be a sequence of
messages mi1, . . . ,mic that αij delivered, such that
m ∈ F i(mic, F i(mic−1, F i(. . . , F i(mi1, si0).next . . .).next).next).output
Sincem is the first invalid message sent by an actor replica, all internal messages
in the sequencemi1, . . . ,mic must be valid. Moreover, external messages are valid
by definition. Thus, all messages mi1, . . . ,mic are valid. But then, m is valid by
definition, contradicting the assumption.
Theorem 3.4.9. (α-Validity.) If hi is honest and αii delivers m from αj , then m is valid
(even if j 6= ⊥ and hj is faulty.)
Proof. If m is an external message, then it is valid and unforgeable by definition.
If m is an internal message, the fact that αii delivers m from αj implies that
αji has sent m to αi. By Lemma 3.4.8, m is valid.
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3.5 Illustration: PBFT
In 1999 Castro and Liskov published “Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance,” a
paper about a Byzantine-tolerant replication protocol (PBFT) for an NFS file sys-
tem [53]. The paper shows that PBFT is indeed practical, adding relatively little
overhead to NFS. In this section we show, informally, that a protocol much like
PBFT can be synthesized from the Viewstamped Replication protocol by Oki
and Liskov [115] and the transformations in this chapter. The main difference is
that our protocol is structured, while PBFT is largely monolithic. In our opinion,
the structure simplifies understanding and enhances the ability to scrutinize the
protocol. The PBFT paper addresses several practical issues and possible opti-
mizations that can be applied to our scheme as well, but omitted for brevity.
Viewstamped Replication is a consensus protocol. A normal case execution
is shown in Figure 3.7(a).3 A client sends a request to a server that is elected
primary. The primary server sends an archive message to each server in the
system. If a quorum responds to the client, the request is completed successfully.
In the case of failures, a possibly infinite number of rounds of this consensus
protocol may be necessary to reach a decision.
If we were to apply translation literally as described, we would end up with
a protocol that sends significantly more messages than PBFT. This is because our
translation does nothing to group related information from a particular sender
to a particular receiver in single messages. Instead, all pieces of information
go out, concurrently, in separate small messages. While explicit optimizations
could eliminate these, FIFO protocols like TCP automatically aggregate concur-
rent traffic between a pair of hosts into single messages for efficiency, obviating
3Slightly optimized by sending decide messages back to the client instead of the primary.
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(a) before translation (b) after translation
Figure 3.7: A normal case run of (a) the original system and (b) the trans-
lated system. Dashed arrows indicate the archive message
from the primary. Between brackets we indicate the corre-
sponding PBFT message types.
the need for any explicit optimizations. Note that while these techniques reduce
the number of messages, the messages become larger and the number of rounds
remains the same.
Figure 3.7(b) shows a normal run of the translated Viewstamped protocol
for t = 1.4 The figure shows only the traffic that is causally prior to the reply
received by the client and, thus, essential to the latency that the client perceives.
In this particular translation we used t additional hosts for OARcast only, but a
more faithful translation would have started with 3t + 1 servers. Nevertheless,
the run closely resembles that of a normal run of PBFT (see Figure 1 of [53]).
Viewstamped Replication solves uniform consensus [60]. Our translation
maintains uniformity5 because of bc-Relay, which requires that if an honest host
delivers a message, then all correct hosts have to do the same. In particular,
4Slightly optimized by sending the echoed archive messages directly to the client. The
client will be able to derive a set of decide messages from the echoed archive messages.
5In Byzantine environment, uniform consensus guarantees that if two honest servers decide
on an update, they decide on the same update.
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ARcast maintains the uniformity in the original protocol by having a receiver
await t + 1 copies of a message before delivery. Doing so makes sure that one
of the copies was sent by a correct receiver that forwards a copy to all other cor-
rect receivers as well. When uniformity is not necessary, a receiver can deliver
the message as soon as the first copy is received. If the receiver is correct, it
will forward the message to all other correct receivers, and (non-uniform) bc-
Relay is preserved. With this optimization, the echo traffic can be piggybacked
on future traffic. Furthermore, the translated Viewstamped protocol with this
optimization is similar to PBFT with tentative execution.
3.6 Discussion
We presented a mechanism to translate a distributed application that tolerates
only crash failures into one that tolerates Byzantine failures. Few restrictions are
placed on the application, and the approach is applicable not only to consensus
but to a large class of distributed applications. The approach makes use of a
novel broadcast protocol. We have illustrated how the approach may be used to
derive a version of the Castro and Liskov Practical Byzantine Replication pro-
tocol, showing that our translation mechanism is pragmatic and more powerful
than previous translation approaches.
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CHAPTER 4
NYSIAD: STRENGTHENING LARGE-SCALE CRASH-TOLERANT
DISTRIBUTED APPLICATIONS
Scalable distributed systems have to tolerate nondeterministic failures from
causes such as Heisenbugs and Mandelbugs [79], aging related or bit errors
(e.g., [110]), selfish behavior (e.g., freeloading), and intrusion. While all these
failures are prevalent and it would seem that large distributed systems have
sufficient redundancy and diversity to handle such failures, developing soft-
ware that delivers scalable Byzantine fault tolerance has proved difficult, and
few such systems have been built and deployed. Distributed systems and pro-
tocols like DNS [106, 107], BGP [103], OSPF [108], IS-IS [116], as well as most
P2P communication systems tolerate only crash failures. Secure versions of such
systems aim to prevent compromise of participants. While important, this issue
is orthogonal to tolerating Byzantine failures as a host is not faulty until it is
compromised.
We know how to build practical scalable Byzantine-tolerant data stores
(e.g., [33, 38, 130]). Various work has also focused on Byzantine-tolerant peer-to-
peer protocols (e.g., [39, 52, 82, 87, 101]). However, the only known and general
approach to developing a Byzantine version of a protocol or distributed sys-
tem is to replace each host by a Replicated State Machine (RSM) [98, 121]. As
replicas of a host can be assigned to existing hosts in the system, this does not
necessarily require a large investment of hardware.
This chapter presents Nysiad, a technique that uses a variant of RSM to
make distributed systems tolerant of Byzantine failures in asynchronous en-
vironments, and evaluates the practicality of the approach. Nysiad leverages
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that most distributed systems already deal with crash failures and, rather than
masking arbitrary failures, translates arbitrary failures into crash failures. Do-
ing so avoids having to solve consensus [70] during normal operation. Nysiad
invokes consensus only when a host needs to communicate with new peers or
when one of its replicas is being replaced.
Instead of treating replicas as symmetric, Nysiad’s replication scheme is es-
sentially primary-backup with the host that is being replicated acting as pri-
mary. Different from RSM’s original specification [98], Nysiad allows the entire
RSM to halt in case the host does not comply with the protocol. A voting pro-
tocol ensures that the output of the RSM is valid. A credit-based flow control
protocol ensures that the RSM processes all its inputs (including external input)
fairly. As a result of combining both properties, the worst that the Byzantine
host can accomplish is to stop processing input, a behavior that the original
system will treat as a crash failure and recover accordingly.
Nysiad is an extension to the translation approach in the previous chapter.
Both approaches translate Byzantine failures to crash failures. But unlike the
previous approach, Nysiad aims for scalable distributed applications that could
run over a long period of time. Nysiad reduces the replication cost and makes
it independent from the system size. Also, Nysiad reconfigures the system to
tolerate more failures that will occur in long runs.
We believe that the cost of Nysiad, while significant, is within the range
of practicality for mission-critical applications. End-to-end message latencies
grow by a factor of 3 compared to message latencies in the original system. The
overhead caused by public key cryptography operations are manageable. Most
alarmingly, the total number of messages sent in the translated system per end-
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to-end message sent in the original system can grow significantly depending
on factors such as the communication behavior of the original system. How-
ever, the message overhead does not grow significantly as a function of the total
number of hosts, and grows only linearly as a function of the number of failures
to be tolerated. Most of the additional traffic is in the form of control messages
that do not carry payload.
The chapter
• evaluates for the first time the overheads involved when applying RSM to
scalable distributed systems;
• shows that RSM does not require solving consensus if the original system
is already tolerant of crash failures;
• presents a novel technique that forces hosts to process input fairly in a
Byzantine environment, or leave;
• demonstrates how automatic reconfiguration can be supported in a
Byzantine-tolerant distributed system.
Section 4.1 describes an execution model and introduces terminology. The
Nysiad design is presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 provides notes on the im-
plementation. Section 4.4 evaluates the performance of systems generated by
Nysiad using various case studies. Section 4.5 discusses limitations and con-
cludes the chapter.
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4.1 Model
A system is a collection of hosts that exchange messages as specified by a pro-
tocol. Below we will use the terms original and translated to refer to the sys-
tems before and after translation, respectively. The original system tolerates
only crash failures, while the translated system tolerates Byzantine failures as
well. For simplicity we will assume that each host runs a deterministic state
machine that transitions in response to receiving messages or expiring timers.
(Nysiad may handle nondeterministic state machines by considering nondeter-
ministic events as inputs.) As a result of input processing, a state machine may
produce messages, intended to be sent to other hosts. The system is assumed
to be asynchronous, with no bounds on event processing, message latencies, or
clock drift.
The hosts are configured in an undirected communication graph (V,E), where
V is the set of hosts and E the set of communication links. A host only com-
municates directly with its adjacent hosts, also called neighbors. The graph may
change over time, for example as hosts join and leave the system. We will ini-
tially assume that the graph is static and known to all hosts. We later weaken
this assumption and address topology changes.
The Nysiad transformation requires that the communication graph has a
guard graph. A t-guard graph of (V,E) is a directed graph (V ′, E ′) with the fol-
lowing requirements:
1. Each host in V has a (directed) edge to at least 3t+ 1 hosts in V ′ (including
itself) called the guards of the host.
2. For each two neighboring hosts in V, the two hosts have edges to at least
47
Figure 4.1: A communication graph (left) and a possible guard graph
(right) for t = 1. In this particular case, each host has exactly
3t+1 guards, and each set of neighbors exactly 2t+1 monitors.
2t + 1 common guards in V ′ (including themselves). We call such guards
the monitors of the two hosts.
We assume that for each host in V at most t of its guards are Byzantine. We also
assume that messages between correct guards of the same host are eventually
delivered (using an underlying retransmission protocol that recovers from mes-
sage loss). Note that a monitor of two hosts is a guard of both hosts, and that
neighbors in V are each other’s guards. Moreover, each host is one of its own
guards.
Within the constraints of these requirements, Nysiad works with any guard
graph. For efficiency it is important to create as few guards per host as possible,
as all guards of a host need to be kept synchronized. However, the require-
ments on guards and monitors may produce guard graphs with some of the
hosts needing more than 3t+ 1 guards.
If V = V ′, no additional hosts are added to the system and hosts guard one
another. Figure 4.1 presents an example communication graph and a possible
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guard graph for t = 1 where no additional hosts were added. Some deploy-
ments may favor adding additional hosts for the sole purpose of guarding hosts
in the original system.
In the current implementation of Nysiad, the guard graph is created and
maintained by a logically centralized, Byzantine-tolerant service called the
Olympus, described in Section 4.2.4. The Olympus certifies the guards of a host,
and is involved only when the communication graph changes as a result of host
churn or new communication patterns in the original system. The Olympus
does not need to be aware of the protocol that the original system employs.
Figure 4.2: Host hi initiates an OARcast execution for t = 1. The time
diagram shows all guards of hi, where only hg3 is faulty.
4.2 Design
Nysiad translates the original system by replicating the deterministic state ma-
chine of a host onto its guards. Nysiad is composed of four subprotocols. The
replication protocol ensures that guards of a host remain synchronized. The attes-
tation protocol guarantees that messages delivered to guards are messages pro-
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duced by a valid execution of the protocol. The credit protocol forces a host to
either process all its input fairly, or to ignore all input. Finally, the epoch protocol
allows the guard graph to be bootstrapped and reconfigured in response to host
churn. The following subsections describe each of these protocols. The final
subsection describes how Nysiad deals with external I/O.
4.2.1 Replication
The state machine of a host is replicated onto the guards of the host, together
constituting a Replicated State Machine (RSM). It is important to keep in mind
that we replicate a host only for ensuring integrity, not for availability or perfor-
mance reasons. After all, the original system can already maintain availability
in the face of unavailable hosts.
Say αij is the replica of the state machine of host hi on guard hj . A host
hi broadcasts input events for its local state machine replica αii to its guards.
A guard hj delivers an input event to αij when hj receives such a broadcast
message from hi. In order to guarantee that the guards of hi stay synchronized
in the face of Byzantine behavior, the hosts use OARcast (see Section 3.3) for
communication.
Using OARcast a host can send a message that is intended for all its guards.
When a guard host hj delivers a message m from hi it means that hj received m,
believes it came from hi, and delivers m to αij , the replica of hi’s state machine
on guard hj . OARcast guarantees the following properties:
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• Relay. If hj and hk are correct, and hj delivers m from hi, then hk delivers
m from hi (even if hi is Byzantine);
• Ordering. If two hosts hj and hk are correct and hj and hk both deliver m1
from hi and m2 from hi, then they do so in the same order (even if hi is
Byzantine);
• Authenticity. If two hosts hi and hj are correct and hi does not sendm, then
hj does not deliver m from hi;
• Persistence. If two hosts hi and hj are correct, and hi sends a message m,
then hj delivers m from hi;
• FIFO. If two hosts hi and hj are correct, and hi sends a message m1 before
m2, then hj delivers m1 from hi before delivering m2 from hi.
Relay guarantees that all correct guards deliver a message if one correct
guard does. Ordering guarantees that all correct guards deliver messages from
the same host in the same order. These two properties together guarantee that
the correct replicas of a host stay synchronized, even if the host is Byzantine.
Authenticity guarantees that Byzantine hosts cannot forge messages of correct
hosts. Persistence rules out a trivial implementation that does not deliver any
messages. FIFO stipulates that correct guards deliver messages from a correct
host in the order sent.
These properties are not as strong as those for asynchronous consensus [70]
and indeed consensus is not necessary for our use, as only the host whose state
is replicated can issue updates (i.e., there is only one proposer). If that host
crashes or stops producing updates for some other reason, no new host has
to be elected to take over its role, and the entire RSM is allowed to halt as a
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result. Indeed, unlike consensus, the OARcast properties can be realized in an
asynchronous environment with failures, as we shall show next.
Figure 4.3: Normal case attestation when t = 1. Here the state machine of
hi sends a message m to the state machine of hj . The guards of
hj are hi, hk, hd, and hj itself, and each run a replica of hj’s state
machine. Hosts hi, hj , and hk monitor hi and hj . hj collects
attestations for m and OARcasts the event to its guards. In this
case only hd needs the attestations.
The implementation of OARcast used in this chapter is as follows. Say a
sending host hi ∈ V wants to OARcast an input message m to its ni guards in
V ′, where (ni > 3t). Each guard hj maintains a sequence number c on behalf
of hi. Using private (MAC-authenticated) FIFO point-to-point connections, hi
sends 〈order-req H(m)〉 to each guard, where H is a cryptographic one-way
hash function. On receipt, hj sends an order certificate 〈order-cert i, c,H(m)〉j
back to hi, where the subscript j means that hj digitally signed the message such
that any host can check its origin.
As at most t of hi’s guards are Byzantine, hi is guaranteed to receive
order-cert messages from at least ni − t different guards with the correct
sequence number and message hash. We call such a collection of order-cert
messages an order proof for (c,m). Byzantine orderers cannot generate conflict-
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ing order proofs (same sequence number, different messages) even if hi itself
is Byzantine, as two order proofs have at least t + 1 order-cert messages in
common, one of which is guaranteed to be generated by a correct guard [104].
hi delivers m locally to αii and forwards m along with an order proof to each
of its guards. On receipt, a guard hj checks that the order proof corresponds to
m and is for the next message from hi. If so, hj delivers m to αij .
To guarantee the Relay property, hj gossips order proofs with the other
guards. A similar implementation of OARcast is proved correct in Chapter 3
(also [86]). That chapter also presents an implementation that does not use pub-
lic key cryptography, but has higher message overhead.
Figure 4.2 shows an example of an OARcast execution. Optimizations are
discussed in Section 4.3. Not counting the overhead of gossip and without ex-
ploiting hardware multicast, a single OARcast to 3t guards uses at most 9t mes-
sages. Gossip can be largely piggybacked on existing traffic.
4.2.2 Attestation
While the replication protocol above guarantees that guards of a host synchro-
nize on its state, it does not guarantee that the host OARcasts valid input events,
because the sending host hi may forge arbitrary input events. We consider two
kinds of input events: message events and timer events. Checking validity for
each is slightly different.
First let us examine message sending. Say in the original system host hi ∈ V
sends a message m to a host hj ∈ V . Because hj is a neighbor of hi it is also
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a guard of hi, and thus in the translated system αij will produce m as an input
event for αjj . Accordingly hj OARcasts m to its guards, but the guards, not sure
whether to trust hj , need a way to verify the validity of m before delivering m
to local replicas. To protect against Byzantine behavior of hj , we require that hj
includes a proof of validity with every OARcast in the form of a collection of
t+ 1 attestations from guards of hi.
Because the guards of hi implement an RSM, each (correct) guard hk ∈ V ′
has a replica αik of the state of hi that producesm. Each guard hk of hi (including
hi and hj) sends 〈attest i, j, sij,H(m)〉k to hj . sij is a sequence number for
messages from i to j, and prevents replay attacks. hj has to collect t of these
attestations in addition to its own and include them in its OARcast to convince
hj’s guards of the validity ofm. Again, correct guards have to gossip attestations
in order to guarantee that every correct guard receives them in case one does.
There are two important optimizations to this. First, as hj only needs t + 1
attestations, only the monitors of hi and hj need to send attestations to guar-
antee that hj gets enough attestations. This not only reduces traffic, but the
monitors are neighbors of hj and thus no additional communication links need
be created. Second, hj does not need the attestations until the last phase of the
OARcast protocol, thus hj can request order certificates before it has received
the attestations. This way ordering and attestation can happen in parallel rather
than sequentially. Both these optimizations are exploited in the implementation
(Section 4.3). Figure 4.3 shows an example of the flow of traffic when using
attestations.
In case of a timer event at a host h, h needs to collect t additional attestations
of its own guards in addition to its own attestation. This prevents h from pro-
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Figure 4.4: Credit mechanism with t = 1. hi and hk are neighbors of hj ,
each sending a message to hj . hj tries to order the message
from hk while ignoring the message from hi. The credit mech-
anism renders the OARcast illegal.
ducing timer events at a rate higher than that of the fastest correct host. While
theoretically this may appear useless in an asynchronous environment, in prac-
tice doing so is important. Consider, for example, a system in which a host
pings its neighbors in order to verify that they are alive. Without timer attesta-
tion, a Byzantine host may force a failure detection by not waiting long enough
for the response to those pings. While in an asynchronous system one cannot
detect failures accurately using a pinging protocol, timer attestation ensures in
this case that a host has to wait a reasonable amount of time. Also, because hosts
only wait for t attestations from more than 2t guards, Byzantine guards cannot
delay or block timer events emitted by correct hosts.
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4.2.3 Credits
While attestation prevents a host from forging invalid input events, a host may
still selectively ignore input events and fail to produce certain output events.
For example, in the pinging example above, a host could respond to pings,
avoiding failure detection, but neglect to process other events. In a multicast
tree application a host could accept input but neglect to forward output to its
children (freeloading). Such a host could even deny wrongdoing by claiming
that it has not yet received the input events or that the output events have al-
ready been sent but simply not yet delivered by the network—after all, we as-
sume that the system is asynchronous.
We present a credit-based approach that forces hosts either to process input
from all sources fairly and produce the corresponding output events, or to cease
processing altogether. The essence of the idea is to require that a host obtain
credits from its guards in order to OARcast new input events, and a guard only
complies if it has received the OARcast from the host for previous input events.
As such, credits are the flip-side of attestations: while attestations prevent a host
from producing bad output, credits force a host to either process all input or
process none of it. If a host elects to process no input, it cannot produce output
and will eventually be considered as a crashed host by the original system.
We will exploit that a single OARcast from a host can order a sequence of
pending input events for its state machine, rather than one input message at
a time. The OARcast’s order certificate binds a single sequence number to the
ordered list of input events. We say that the OARcast orders the events in the
list.
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A credit is a signed object of the form 〈credit j, c, ~vi,j〉i, where hi has to be a
guard of hj . hi sends such a credit to hj to approve delivery of the cth OARcast
message from hj , provided a certain ordering condition specified by ~vi,j holds.
Including c prevents replay attacks. The ordering constraint ~vi,j is a vector that
contains an entry for each state machine that hi and hj both guard. Such an
entry contains how many events (possibly 0) the corresponding state machine
replica on hi has produced for α
j
i .
For each neighbor hk of hj , hj has to collect at least t+ 1 credits for OARcast
c from monitors of hj and hk. However, hj can only use a credit for an OARcast
if the OARcast orders all messages specified in the credit’s ordering constraint
that were not ordered already by OARcasts numbered less than c. These two
constraints taken together guarantee that an OARcast contains a credit from a
correct monitor for each of its neighbors, and prevents hj from ignoring input
messages that correct monitors observe while ordering other input messages.
For example, consider Figure 4.4, showing five hosts. hi and hk are neigh-
bors of hj . hij is a monitor for hosts hi and hj , while hjk is a monitor for hj and
hk. Assume t = 1. Consider a situation in which hj has not yet sent any OAR-
casts, but αii has produced a message mi for hj on hosts hi and hij , while αkk has
produced a messagemk for hj on hosts hk and hjk. Each guard of hj sends credit
for the first OARcast that reflects the messages produced locally for hj .
Now assume that hj is Byzantine and trying to ignore messages from hi but
process messages from hk. hj has to include a credit from either hi or hij . Be-
cause hj is Byzantine and t = 1, both hi and hij have to be correct and will not
collude with hj . If hj tries to order only mk as shown in the figure, receiving
hosts will note that at least one credit requires that a message from hi has to
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be ordered and will therefore ignore the OARcast (and report the message to
authorities as proof of wrongdoing).
As with other credit-based flow control mechanisms, a window w may be
used to allow for pipelining of messages. Initially, each guard of hj sends credits
for the first w OARcasts from hj , specifying an empty ordering constraint. Then,
on receipt of the cth OARcast, a guard sends a credit for OARcast c + w, using
an ordering constraint that reflects the current set of produced messages for hj .
If w = 1, the next OARcast cannot be issued until it has been received by at least
t + 1 monitors of each neighbor and the new credits have been communicated
to hj . If w > 1 pipelining becomes possible, but at the expense of additional
freedom for hj . In practice we found thatw = 2 enables good performance while
monitors still have significant control over the order of messages produced by
the hosts they guard.
4.2.4 Epochs
So far we have assumed that the communication graph (V,E) and its t-guard
graph (V ′, E ′) are static and well-known to all hosts. This is necessary, because
when a host receives an OARcast it has to check that the order certificates, the
attestations, and the credits were generated by qualified hosts. In particular,
order certificates and credits have to be generated by a guard of the sending host
of an OARcast message, and each attestation of a message has to be generated
by monitors of the source and destination of the message. Also, the receiving
host of an OARcast has to know how many guards the sending host has in order
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to check that a message contains a sufficient number of ordering certificates and
credits.
While Nysiad, in theory, could inspect the code of the state machines, it has
no good way of determining which hosts will be communicating with which
other hosts, and so in reality even the communication graph (V,E) is initially
unknown, let alone its guard graph. Making matters worse, such a communi-
cation graph often evolves over time.
Figure 4.5: Example of an execution of the reconfiguration protocol. hi1,
hi2, and hi3 are guards of hi. When the Olympus suspects that
hi3 has failed, it requests the current epoch of hi to be concluded
and installs a new set of guards, replacing hi3 with hi3′ .
In order to handle this problem, we introduce a logically centralized (but
Byzantine-replicated [53]) trusted certification service that we call the Olympus.
The Olympus is not involved in normal communication, but only in charge of
tracking the communication graph and updating the guard graph accordingly.
The Olympus produces signed epoch certificates for hosts, which contain suffi-
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cient information for a receiver of an OARcast message to check its validity. In
particular, an epoch certificate for a host hi describes
• the host identifier (i);
• the set of the identifiers of all hi’s guards;
• the epoch number (described below);
• a hash of the final state of the host in the previous epoch.
The Olympus does not need to know the protocol that the original system
uses. Initially, the Olympus assigns 3t guards to each host arbitrarily, in addi-
tion to the host itself. Each guard starts in epoch 0 and runs the state machine
starting from a well-defined initial state. Order certificates and credits have to
contain the epoch number in order to prevent replay attacks of old certificates
in later epochs. Next we describe a general protocol for changing guards and
how this protocol is used to handle reconfigurations.
Changing-of-the-guards
While the Olympus assigns guards to hosts, the changing-of-the-guards protocol
starts with the guards themselves. In response to triggers that we will describe
below, each guard of hi sends a state certificate containing the current epoch num-
ber and a secure hash of its current state to hi. After the guard receives an ac-
knowledgment from hi it is free to clean up its replica, unless the guard is hi
itself. However, in order to avoid replay attacks the guard needs to remember
that this epoch of hi’s execution has terminated.
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When hi has received ni − t such certificates (typically including its own)
that correspond to its own state, hi sends the collection of state certificates to
the Olympus. ni − t certificates together guarantee that there are at most t cor-
rect guards and t Byzantine guards that are still active, not enough to order
additional OARcast messages. Effectively, the collection certifies that the state
machine of hi has halted in the given state.
In response, the Olympus assigns new guards to hi and creates a new epoch
certificate using an incremented epoch number and the state hash, and sends
the certificate to hi. On receipt, hi sends its signed state and the new epoch
certificate to its new collection of guards. Recipients check validity of the state
using the hash in the epoch certificate and resume normal operation.
Reconfiguration
One scenario in which the changing-of-the-guards protocol is triggered is when
guards of hi produce a message m for another host hj for the first time. Each
correct guard sends a state certificate to hi when it produces the message. The
state has to be such that the message m is about to be produced, so that when the state
machine is later restarted, possibly on a different guard, m is produced and processed
the normal way. The state certificate also indicates that a message for hj is being
produced, so that the Olympus may know the reason for the invocation.
hi collects ni − t state certificates, and sends the collection to the Olympus.
The Olympus, now convinced that hi has produced a message for hj , requests hj
to change its guards as well. hj does this by OARcasting a special end-epoch
message, triggering the changing-of-the-guards protocol at each guard in the
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same state. (Should hj not respond then it is up to the Olympus to decide when
to declare hj faulty, block hj’s guards, and restart hi.)
Assuming the Olympus has received the state certificates for both hi and hj ,
the Olympus can assign new guards to each in order to satisfy the constraints of
the guard graph. The Olympus then sends new epoch certificates to both hi and
hj , after which each sends its certificate to its new guards. These guards start in
a state where they first produce m, which can now be processed normally.
The Olympus also undertakes reconfiguration when it determines that a
guard of a host has failed. In order to detect crash failures, the Olympus may
periodically ping all guards to determine responsiveness. (A more scalable so-
lution is described in [87]. Note that while a false positive may introduce over-
head, it is not a correctness issue.) Also, guards send proof of observable Byzan-
tine behavior to the Olympus. In response to detection of a failure of a guard of
a host other than the host itself, the Olympus requests the host to OARcast an
end-epoch message to invoke the changing-of-the-guards protocol. Figure 4.5
shows an example.
Should a host hi ∈ V be detected as faulty then the Olympus sends a message
to all hi’s guards, requesting them to block further OARcasts from hi. Once
the Olympus has received acknowledgments from ni − t guards, the Olympus
knows that hi can no longer produce input for other hosts successfully.
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4.2.5 External I/O
So far we have assumed that Nysiad translates a system in its entirety. However,
often such a system serves external clients that cannot easily be treated in the
same way. We cannot expect to be able to replicate those clients onto multiple
hosts, and it becomes impossible to verify that the clients send valid data using
a general technique. To wit, a Byzantine-tolerant storage service does not verify
the validity of the data that it stores, nor does a Byzantine-tolerant multicast
service check the data from the broadcaster. The usual assumption, from the
system’s point of view, is to trust clients.
In Nysiad, we treat external clients as trusted hosts. Such hosts may crash
or leave, but there is no need to replicate their state machines, nor to attest the
data they generate. However, when a trusted host hi sends a message to an
untrusted host hj , we do want to make sure that hj treats the input fairly with
respect to other inputs that it receives. Vice versa, when hj sends a message to
hi, hi has to collect attestations in order to verify the validity of the message. We
also want to prevent hj from withholding messages for hi.
The methodology we developed so far can be adapted to achieve these re-
quirements. We assign the pair (hi, hj) 2t + 1 half-monitors. Each half-monitor
runs a full replica of hj’s state machine, but for hi only keeps track of the mes-
sages that hi sends. Unlike normal monitors, hi itself does not run a half-
monitor, but hj does.
When hi wants to send a message to hj , it sends a copy of the message to
each half-monitor using authenticated FIFO channels. (The half-monitors gos-
sip the receipt of this message with one another to ensure that either all or
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none of the correct half-monitors receive the message in a situation in which
hi crashes during sending.) Like normal monitors, half-monitors generate attes-
tations for messages from hi so that hj can convince others of the validity of that
input. More importantly, half-monitors generate credits for hj forcing hj to treat
hi’s messages fairly with respect to its other inputs. In a similar manner, half-
monitors generate attestations for messages from hj to hi so that hi can verify
the validity of those messages. Should hj itself fail to send messages to hi then
the half-monitors can provide the necessary copy.
4.3 Implementation Details
In order to evaluate overheads we implemented Nysiad in Java. In this section
we provide details on how we construct guard graphs and how we combine the
various subprotocols into a single coherent protocol.
Given a communication graph and a parameter t many different guard
graphs are often possible. For efficiency and fault tolerance it is prudent to
minimize the number of guards per host (see Section 4.1). We are not aware of
an optimal algorithm for determining such a graph. We devised the following
algorithm to create a t-guard graph of the communication graph. It runs in two
phases. In the first phase the algorithm considers each pair of neighbors (hi, hj).
Initially hi and hj are assigned as monitors. The algorithm then determines the
hosts that are 1 hop away from the current set of monitors, and adds, randomly,
such hosts to the set of monitors until there are no such hosts left or until the
number of monitors has reached 2t + 1. This step is repeated until the set of
monitors has reached the required size. Note that the monitors are guards to
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both hi and hj . In the next phase, the algorithm considers all hosts individually.
If a host has fewer than 3t + 1 guards then the closest hosts in terms of hop
distance are added, randomly as before, until the desired number of guards is
reached.
While best understood separately, the OARcast, attestation, and credit pro-
tocols combine into a single replication protocol. Doing so reduces message and
CPU overheads significantly, while also simplifying implementation. Consider
the cth OARcast from some host hi, and assume hi has the necessary credits and
has produced the messages required by those credits. At this point hi creates
an order-req, containing a list of hashes of the messages that it has produced
but not yet ordered in previous OARcasts, and sends the request to each of its
ni guards.
On receipt, each guard signs a single certificate that contains the credit for
OARcast c+w, an order certificate for OARcast c, and any attestations that it can
create for messages in OARcast c. This way the signing and checking costs of all
certificate types can be amortized. The guard sends the resulting certificate back
to hi. hi awaits ni−t certificates, which collectively are guaranteed to contain the
necessary order certificates and attestations for completing the current OARcast,
and the necessary credits for OARcast c+ w.
In the third and final round, hi sends these aggregate certificates to its
guards. On receipt, a guard has to check the signatures on all certificates except
its own. The end-to-end latency consists of three network latencies, plus the
latency of signing (done in parallel by each of the guards) and checking ni − 1
certificates (executed in parallel as well). The more messages can be ordered by
a single OARcast, the more these costs can be amortized.
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An execution of OARcast requires 3 · (ni − 1) FIFO messages. Since ni > 3t,
the minimum number of FIFO messages per OARcast is 9t. In order to further
reduce traffic, Nysiad also tries to combine messages for different OARcasts—
if two FIFO messages are sent at approximately the same time between two
different hosts, they are combined in a manner similar to back-to-back messages
in the TCP protocol.
4.4 Case Studies
While one cannot test if a system tolerates Byzantine failures, it is possible to
measure the overheads involved. In this section we report on two case studies:
a point-to-point link-level routing protocol and a peer-to-peer multicast proto-
col. We applied Nysiad to each and ran the result over a simulated network
to measure network overheads and overheads caused by cryptographic opera-
tions.
For the point-to-point routing protocol we selected Scalable Source Routing
(SSR) [71]. SSR is inspired by the Chord overlay routing protocol [125], but can
be deployed on top of the link layer. (SSR is similar to Virtual Ring Routing [51],
which applies the same idea to Pastry.)
The basic idea of SSR is simple. Each host initially knows its own (location-
independent) identifier and those of the neighbors it is directly connected to.
The SSR protocol organizes the hosts into a Chord-like ring by having each host
discover a source route to its successor and predecessor. This is done as fol-
lows. Initially a host hi sends a message to its best guess at its successor. Should
this tentative successor host know of a better successor for hi, or discover one
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later, then the successor host sends a source route for the better successor back
to hi. On receipt hi sends a message to its new best guess at its successor, and
so on. This protocol converges into the desired ring and terminates. Once the
ring is established routing can be done in a Chord-like manner, whereby a mes-
sage travels around the ring, but taking shortcuts whenever possible. In our
simulations we measure the ring-discovery protocol, not the routing itself.
The multicast protocol is even simpler. Here we assume that the hosts are
organized in a balanced binary tree, and that each host forwards messages from
its parent to its children (if any). We call this protocol MCAST. We measured the
overhead of sending a message from the root host to all hosts.
We considered two network graph configurations. In the first, Tree, the net-
work graph is a balanced binary tree. In the second, Random, we placed hosts
uniformly at random on a square metric space, and connected each host to its k
closest peers.
We report on three configurations:
• SSR/Random The SSR protocol on top of a Random graph;
• SSR/Tree The SSR protocol on a Tree graph;
• MCAST/Tree The MCAST protocol on a Tree graph.
For the evaluation we developed a simple discrete time event network sim-
ulator to evaluate message overheads. The fidelity of the simulation was kept
low in order to scale the simulation experiments to interesting sizes. While the
simulator models network latency, we assume bandwidth is infinite. The public
key signature operations were replaced by simple hash functions. We focus our
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evaluation on the failure-free “normal case” executions. We vary the number of
hosts and t, and in the case of the Random graph we also vary k, the (minimum)
number of neighbors of each host. In all experiments, the credits window w was
chosen to be 2.
By and large, the increase in latency is close to a factor of 3 for all experi-
ments, independent of what parameters are chosen. (No graphs shown.) This
amount of increase was expected as the OARcast protocol consists of three
rounds of communication (see Section 4.3). This can be decreased to two rounds
by having the guards broadcast certificates directly to each other, but this results
in a message overhead that is quadratic in t rather than linear.
When measuring message overhead, we report on the ratio between the
number of FIFO messages sent in the translated protocol and the number of
FIFO messages sent in the original protocol. We call this the message overhead
factor, and report the minimum, average, and maximum over 10 executions. We
ignore messages sent on behalf of the gossip protocol that implement the Relay
property of OARcast. These messages do not require additional cryptographic
operations and contribute only a small and constant load on the network.
For measuring CPU overhead, we report only the number of public key sign-
ing and checking operations per message per guard. Such operations tend to
dominate protocol processing overheads. We found the variance for these mea-
surements to be low, the minimum and maximum usually being within 1 opera-
tion from the average number of operations, and so we report only the averages.
In the first set of experiments, we used the SSR/Random configuration using
a Random graph with k = 3. In Figure 4.6(a) we show the message overhead
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factor for t = 1, 2, 3. As we described in Section 4.3, an OARcast to n guards
uses at most 3n messages, and we see that this explains the trends well. There
is an increase in overhead as we increase the number of hosts due to an increase
in the average number of guards per host and reduced opportunity for aggrega-
tion as traffic becomes less concentrated due to the larger graph. Small graphs
necessitate more sharing of guards, which reduces overhead.
Figure 4.6(b) reports, per guard the average number of public key sign and
check operations per message in the original system. Due to aggregation, the
number of sign operations message in the original system per guard is always
less than 1 and does not significantly depend on t, as can be understood from
Section 4.3. However, guards have to check each other’s signatures and The
number of check operations per message per guard may exceed 3t because a
host may have more than 3t+ 1 guards, and, as stated above larger graphs tend
to have more guards. Nonetheless, these graphs should also reach an asymp-
tote.
Next, for the same SSR/Random configuration, we fix t = 2 and range k
from 3 to 6. We show the message and public key signature overhead measure-
ments in Figure 4.7. Even though t is fixed, an increase in the number of neigh-
bors per host requires additional monitors, and thus the average number of
guards per host tends to increase beyond the required 3t+ 1, causing additional
message and CPU overhead. It is thus important for overhead of translation
and indeed for fault tolerance to configure the original protocol to use as sparse
a graph as possible. This tends to increase the diameter of the communication
graph, and thus a suitable trade-off has to be designed.
In the final experiments, we compare the three different configurations for
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t = 1. For the Random graph we chose k = 3. In the case of a Tree graph, the
average number of neighbors per host is approximately 2, internal hosts having
3 neighbors, leaf hosts having 1 neighbor, and the root host having 2 neighbors.
We report results in Figure 4.8.
MCAST suffers most message overhead. This is because there is no oppor-
tunity for message aggregation in the experiment—each host receives only one
message (from its parent). However, when multiple messages are streamed,
the opportunity for message aggregation is excellent—any backlog that builds
up can be combined and ordered using a single OARcast operation—and thus
throughput is not limited by this overhead. Even if messages cannot be aggre-
gated, order certificates, attestations, and credits still can, and thus signature
generation and checking overheads are still good.
SSR performs significantly better on the Tree graph than on the Random
graph. Because communication opportunities are more limited in the Tree graph
with fewer neighbors to choose from, many messages can be aggregated and
ordered simultaneously. For such situations the message overhead can indeed
completely disappear.
Finally, note that if hardware multicast were available the overhead of
Nysiad could be significantly reduced (from 9t point-to-point messages for an
OARcast in the best case to 3t point-to-point messages and 2 multicasts).
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4.5 Discussion
Nysiad can generate a Byzantine-tolerant version of a system that was designed
to tolerate only crash failures. This comes with significant overheads. When
developing a Byzantine-tolerant file system, such overheads are easily masked
by the overhead of accessing the disk and large data transfers. When applied to
message routing protocols where there is no disk overhead and payload sizes
are relatively small, overheads cannot be masked as easily.
In practice, Nysiad may be used to generate a first cut at a Byzantine-tolerant
protocol or distributed system, and then apply application-specific optimiza-
tions that maintain correctness. For example, if it is possible to distinguish the
retransmission of a data packet from the original transmission, then it may be
possible for the original transmission to be routed unguarded. Doing so could
potentially mask most overhead of Nysiad.
But even if such optimizations are not possible, some applications may
choose robustness over raw speed. Byzantine fault tolerance can be a part of
increasing security, but it does not solve all security problems. Nysiad is not
intended to defend against intrusion, but to tolerate intrusions. Defense against
intrusion involves authentication and authorization techniques, as well as intru-
sion detection, and these are essential to guarantee that there is sufficient diver-
sity among guards and no more than a small fraction are compromised. In the
face of a limited number of successful intrusions Nysiad maintains integrity and
availability of a system, but it does not provide confidentiality of data. Worse
still, the replication of state complicates confidentiality. Hosts cannot trust their
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guards for confidentiality, and confidential data has to be encrypted in an end-
to-end fashion.
Another possibility is to run some of the mechanisms that Nysiad uses inside
secured hosts that are more difficult to compromise than hosts “in the field.”
Such secured hosts may have reduced general functionality and use their re-
sources to guard a relatively large number of state machines.
Nysiad makes strong assumptions about how many hosts can fail using the
threshold value t. But what happens if more than t guards of a host become
Byzantine? Now the host can in fact behave in a Byzantine fashion and break the
system. As a system becomes larger it becomes more likely that a host has more
than t Byzantine guards, and thus t should the chosen large enough to handle
the maximum system size. If N is the maximum system size, then t should be
chosen O(logN) in order to keep the probability that any host in the system has
more than t Byzantine guards sufficiently low. As [87] demonstrates, a value
for t of 2 or 3 is probably sufficient for most applications. It is also important
that, as much as possible, proofs of observed Byzantine behavior are sent to the
Olympus immediately so that faulty hosts can be removed quickly [133].
Nysiad exploits diversity and is defenseless against deterministic bugs that
either cause a host to make an incorrect state transition or allow an attacker to
compromise more than t host. The use of configuration wizards, high-level lan-
guages, and bug-finding tools may help avoid such problems. Similarly, Nysiad
is helpless in the face of link-level Denial-of-Service attacks. These should be
controlled by network-level anti-DoS techniques.
Nysiad in its current form uses the Olympus, a logically centralized service,
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to handle configuration changes. Because the Olympus is not invoked during
normal operation, the load on the Olympus is likely sufficiently low for many
practical applications. This architecture does not deal well with high churn, nor
does the translated protocol handle network partitions well: hosts that cannot
communicate with the Olympus are excluded from participating.
We have evaluated the use of Nysiad for systems where each host has a
relatively small number of neighbors with which it communicates actively. Fig-
ure 4.7 shows that overhead grows as a function of the number of neighbors. In
systems where hosts have many active neighbors the overhead of the Nysiad
protocols could be substantial. One can consider a variant of Nysiad where not
all neighbors of a host are guards in order to contain overhead. The challenge is
how to ensure that the set of guards contains 2t+ 1 monitors for each link.
Closely related to Nysiad is the PeerReview system [81], providing account-
ability [133] in distributed systems. PeerReview detects those Byzantine fail-
ures that are observable by a correct host. Like Nysiad, PeerReview assumes
that each host implements a protocol using a deterministic state machine. Peer-
Review maintains incoming and outgoing message logs and, periodically, runs
incoming logs through the state machines and checks output against outgoing
logs. PeerReview can only detect a subclass of Byzantine failures, and only after
the fact. Like reputation management and intrusion detection systems, account-
ability deters intentionally faulty behavior, but does not prevent or tolerate it.
Nysiad is a general technique for developing scalable Byzantine-tolerant
systems and protocols in an asynchronous environment that does not require
consensus to be solved. Starting with a system tolerant of crash failures only,
Nysiad assigns a set of guards to each host that verify the output of the host
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and constrain the order in which the host handles its inputs. A logically central-
ized service assigns guards to hosts in response to churn in the communication
graph. Simulation results show that Nysiad may be practical for a large class of
distributed systems.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.6: Message overhead factor (a) and public key signing and check-
ing overheads (b) as a function of the number of hosts for run-
ning SSR on a Random graph using k = 3 and various t.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.7: Message overhead (a) and public key signing and checking
overheads (b) as a function of the number of hosts for the SSR
protocol on a Random graph using t = 2 and various k, the
minimum number of neighbors per host.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.8: Message overhead factor (a) and public key signing and check-
ing overheads (b) as a function of the number of hosts for vari-
ous protocols and graphs using t = 1 and k = 3.
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CHAPTER 5
SHUTTLE: AFFORDABLE BYZANTINE REPLICATION
Nysiad (Chapter 4) is designed for strengthening crash-tolerant distributed
applications to Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT). The technique is applicable to
scalable systems with reasonable overhead on replication and performance.
Nonetheless, the overhead is still far from appealing to practitioners:
• Replication cost. To tolerate t Byzantine faults, Nysiad requires 2t + 1 mon-
itors (i.e., replicas) for each link, with a minimum of 3t + 1 replicas total
for each host. This requirement may result in high replication cost, where
hosts have more than 3t+ 1 replicas.
• Computational cost. Nysiad relies on expensive RSA public-key digital
signatures for authenticating messages. Though the average numbers of
signing and verifying operations per application message can be small in
practice (see, for examples, Figures 4.6(b), 4.7(b), and 4.8(b)) the compu-
tational cost of RSA operations still imposes significant overhead on the
performance of the application.
In this chapter we propose Shuttle, a technique that improves on Nysiad.
First, Shuttle reduces the replication costs in Nysiad by (1) eliminating the
links’ monitors in Nysiad and using a retransmission and an acknowledgment
mechanisms to prevent send and receive omission, and (2) reducing the num-
ber of replicas in Nysiad to t + 1 for tolerating t Byzantine failures. Second,
Shuttle reduces computational cost by using cheaper cryptographic primitives
(e.g., HMAC [92] and CRC [118] vs. RSA [120]). And third, Shuttle strength-
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ens Nysiad so that it can translate any distributed applications (not just crash-
tolerant ones) to BFT ones.
Shuttle is optimized by reducing its bandwidth consumption. The optimiza-
tion follows the communication approach in Chain Replication [128]. Com-
pared to the broadcast communication pattern (e.g., in Primary-Backup replica-
tion [49]), the chain communication pattern significantly reduces message com-
plexity while pipelining supports high throughput.
Shuttle is further optimized by considering a stronger assumption about ad-
versaries, which restricts certain faulty behavior. The optimization is rooted
in our observation that Byzantine fault tolerance cannot actually tolerate every
type of failure. For example, if a machine fails because its vulnerabilities are
exploited by a hacker, the hacker can compromise other machines that have the
same vulnerabilities as well. 1 Also, we observe that Byzantine fault tolerance
was invented (in the SIFT project [131]) for arbitrary failures that behave more
in a random fashion than as if being controlled by hackers. The stronger as-
sumption still fits those failures, while it reduces the replication cost, which in
turn improves the latency and throughput of the system.
The chapter is organized as follows. First we describe a model of a dis-
tributed system in Section 5.1 and the problem we want to solve in Section 5.2.
Then we introduce our solution in Section 5.3. The next few sections deal with
the details of our solution:
• Section 5.4 develops a solution.
• Section 5.5 proves the correctness of the solution.
1N-version programming approaches such as BASE [54] can help, but they do not scale.
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• Section 5.6 enhances the solution in practice.
• Section 5.7 evaluates the solution.
Finally, Section 5.8 closes the chapter.
5.1 A Distributed System Model
A distributed system comprises a set of N server agents that implement a dis-
tributed application and a set of client agents. The agents communicate with one
another by message passing over a reliable FIFO network. Each server agent,
or server for short, implements a deterministic state machine,2 specified in Fig-
ure 5.1. For simplicity of exposition, the state of a server p includes the full
history of requests made to that server (called Histp). In practice implementa-
tions would likely maintain only a compact running state. Each server p also
maintains InputSetp, the set of requests that the server has received, and a set of
output messages OutputSetp. A message is a triple 〈src, dst, payload〉 of its source
agent src, its destination agent dst, and a payload.
The specification also lists transitions. Each transition gives a predicate, and a
list of actions to be taken when the predicate becomes true. In S1T1 in Figure 5.1,
when a new request message r arrives at a server p, the predicate r ∈ InputSetp∧
r 6∈ Histp becomes true. Server p performs three actions. First, it produces the
output messages by evaluating executep(r,Histp). Second, it puts the output
messages into the output set. And third, it appends the request to the history.
Note that executep(., .) is the application function for server p. Once a message
2Non-determinism, such as random values and clock values, can be modeled as inputs to
deterministic transitions.
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State:
Histp, InputSetp,OutputSetp // initially empty
Transitions:
S1T1. On r ∈ InputSetp ∧ r 6∈ Histp →
results := executep(r,Histp)
Histp := Histp :: r
OutputSetp := OutputSetp ∪ results
S1T2. Onm = 〈p, dst, payload〉 ∧
m ∈ OutputSetp ∧m 6∈ InputSetdst →
InputSetdst := InputSetdst ∪ {m}
Figure 5.1: A high-level specification of a server p.
is in the output set, it is eventually added into the destination’s input set by
the transition S1T2 in Figure 5.1. This models message transmission across the
network.
The distributed system is asynchronous: there is no bound on how long it
takes before a continuously enabled transition is performed.
5.2 Problem Statement
Given a set ofN distributed application functions execute1(., .), execute2(., .),
. . ., executeN(., .), we are interested in the design and implementation of a cor-
rect, low-cost, and high-throughput distributed system where each server imple-
ments the specification in Figure 5.1 and works in the following settings.
The system supplies an abundant number of processes, which are determin-
istic state machines. They are units of failure. A process can be correct, when
it faithfully follows the protocols’ steps, or failed. When a process fails, it can
behave arbitrarily, or in a Byzantine way. For instance, it can stop, omit send-
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ing/receiving messages, or produce unspecified messages. However, a Byzan-
tine process is limited in what it can forge. In this chapter, we consider two
assumptions, which will lead to different replication and computation costs.
Strong Adversary Assumption: Byzantine processes do not forge MAC
signatures on messages sent between two correct processes. Also, they do
not forge RSA signatures generated by a correct process.
Weak Adversary Assumption: Byzantine processes do not forge CRC
checksums generated by a different process and do not compute CRC check-
sums on corrupted data, such as truncated request histories.
The first assumption is frequently stated in the BFT literature. The second
assumption is considerably stronger. It models systems where failures are ac-
cidental and in a random fashion, such as bit flips and Mandelbugs [79]. In
practice, we can implement this assumption by using ECC memory (similar to
SafeMem [119]) or keeping multiple copies of the history. When a server re-
ceives a request for its history, the server returns the checksum of every copy.
As failures are accidental and occur in a random fashion, it is highly unlikely
that all copies are incorrectly modified in the same way. Different checksums of
a history indicate that the history is corrupted or truncated.
The processes communicate over a reliable FIFO network.3 The transmission
of messages between any two correct processes is guaranteed.
The system is partially synchronous (as introduced in [68]). It starts with no
bounds on the network’s transmission time and processes’ computational time.
3In practice, a reliable FIFO network can be implemented over a fair network by sequence
numbers and retransmission.
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But there exists a Global Stabilization Time (GST) [68], after which the network’s
transmission time and processes’ computational time are bounded, all failed
processes are detected or suspected, and no more processes fail.
In order to define the correctness of a system, we first define what it means
for a message to be valid. All messages from clients are assumed to be valid.4 A
message m from a server p is valid if and only if there exists a sequence of valid
messages m1,m2, . . . ,mc destined for p such that
m ∈ executep(mc, [m1,m2, . . . ,mc−1]).
For correctness, each server in the system must implement the specification
in Figure 5.1. In addition, each server needs to keep state consistent over time
and needs to make progress. More formally, a server p needs to preserve the
following properties:
• Safety. Histp, InputSetp, and OutputSetp must contain only valid requests.
Also,
– If H = Histp at time T and H ′ = Histp at time T ′ > T , then H is a
prefix of H ′.
– If I = InputSetp at time T and I ′ = InputSetp at time T ′ > T , then
I ⊆ I ′.
– If O = OutputSetp observed at time T and O′ = OutputSetp at time
T ′ > T , then O ⊆ O′.
• Liveness. After GST, every transition that is continuously enabled will
happen.
4We consider Byzantine clients later.
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5.3 A Refinement Approach
We approach a solution to our problem by refining the server specification in
Figure 5.1 in two steps. The first refinement introduces attestation and verifica-
tion, while the second refinement results in an executable replication protocol.
We also discuss how to deal with failures in the final refinement of the protocol.
Attestation and Verification
Figure 5.1 specifies how a server should work. It models a server in an ideal
environment, where there is no failure. In this first refinement, we still assume
that servers do not fail, but they may have external adversaries that try to interfere
by forging their messages. To protect the servers from external adversaries, we
introduce two steps to their specification:
• Attestation. Servers attest each message they send by supplying a validity
proof of the message.
• Verification. Servers verify each message they receive by verifying the va-
lidity proof associated with the message.
The attestation and verification have the following properties:
• AV1. A server p attests a message m = 〈p, q, payload〉 only if m is valid.
• AV2. A server q successfully verifies a message m = 〈p, q, payload〉 only if
server p has attested m.
• AV3. The attestation and verification steps terminate.
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State:
Histp, InputSetp,OutputSetp,Unverifiedp
Transitions:
S2T1. On (r, proof) ∈ Unverifiedp ∧ r 6∈ InputSetp →
if verifyp(r, proof) then
InputSetp := InputSetp ∪ {r}
S2T2. On r ∈ InputSetp ∧ r 6∈ Histp →
results := executep(r,Histp)
Histp := Histp :: r
OutputSetp := OutputSetp ∪ {(m,attestp(m)) |m ∈ results}
S2T3. On sm = (〈p, dst, payload〉, proof) ∧
sm ∈ OutputSetp ∧ sm 6∈ Unverifieddst →
Unverifieddst := Unverifieddst ∪ {sm}
Figure 5.2: First refinement of a server p.
Figure 5.2 presents the refinement of the high-level specification in Figure 5.1
with attestation and verification. Histp, InputSetp, and OutputSetp are as in the
high-level specification, except that p attests its output messages (in S2T2) be-
fore putting into the output set. Transition S2T2 corresponds to transition S1T1.
Also, messages are no longer directly transmitted from output sets to their des-
tinations’ input sets as in S1T2. Instead, messages intended for p are first added
to a set Unverifiedp (in S2T3). Transition S2T3 corresponds to a no-op in the high-
level specification. Finally, server p verifies those messages before adding them
to its input set (in S2T1). In this case, transition S2T1 corresponds to transition
S1T2. But when a message fails the verification, it is ignored. In this case, tran-
sition S2T1 corresponds to a no-op in the high-level specification.
Safety and Liveness
Here we informally and briefly argue why properties AV1-3 are desirable for
the attestation and verification steps. In particular, AV1-3 preserve Safety and
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Liveness when there are external adversaries. The full proof of correctness is
deferred until the second refinement.
Liveness is preserved because the attestation and verification steps are non-
blocking (by AV3) and because the network is reliable. Safety is preserved first
because each server p only adds a request into its input set and history (S2T1 and
S2T2) after the request has been verified (S2T1). AV2 ensures that p successfully
verified the request only if the sender of the request has attested it. This hap-
pens only if the request is valid, as AV1 guarantees. Second, Safety is preserved
because a server p only adds a request into its output set after it has attested
the request. AV1 ensures that the output set contains only valid requests. And
third, Safety is preserved because no transition takes requests out of any input
set, output set, or history.
5.4 The Shuttle Replication Protocol
So far we have assumed that servers do not fail. This assumption is not realistic,
especially in a large scale distributed environment. In this section we refine the
specification in Figure 5.2 so that the system tolerates server failures.
We will first describe our approach at a high level. Then we will discuss
each aspect of the approach in detail, starting with a reasoning about how to
replicate a server at a minimal cost. The discussion includes a refinement of the
specification (Figure 5.2) and the component protocols.
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Figure 5.3: Overview of the Shuttle approach. N, A, P, and D are states of
a configuration; and stp, arp, fdp, and ccp are protocols that
run in the states. RDY, RCV, FDS, and CLN are events input to
the states. Transitions are labeled S2T1, S2T2, and S2T3 if they
correspond to those spec transitions (in Figure 5.2); otherwise,
they correspond to no-op.
5.4.1 Overview
Various types of failure may occur. Some failures, such as crashes, are impossi-
ble to detect accurately in an asynchronous system. We can at best suspect them
when the system becomes unresponsive. Some other failures we can readily de-
tect and pinpoint to a particular process. Yet other failures we can detect, but
we cannot prove which process is the culprit. For the Shuttle approach, we cat-
egorize failures as provable and unprovable. When a process detects a failure, if
it can compile a proof of misbehavior [36] to convince other processes about the
failure, then the failure is provable.5 Other failures detected or suspected are
unprovable.
We implement each server by a group of processes, so that the application
5We do not discuss how to detect failures and make them provable. Interested readers may
refer to PeerReview [81] for details.
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state persists over process failures. The approach is known as state machine repli-
cation [93, 121]. Each server p becomes a replicated server (or group), denoted by
Gp, that contains multiple processes playing different roles. The set of processes,
an assignment of roles (e.g., replica, witness, leader, etc.), and the value of t
(which can differ from group to group) are called a configuration of the repli-
cated server. Each configuration has a unique configuration identifier (CID). A
replicated server replaces its configuration to overcome failures. A configura-
tion goes through four states (not to be confused with state of the application):
N, A, P, and D. The encoding of a configuration is called a configuration represen-
tation. For example, a configuration representation may include a CID, a set of
process identifiers, a role assignment, and a value for t. Each replicated server
may have its own size (i.e., different t value). But for simplicity of the discussion,
we will let n be the size of a replicated server unless explicitly stating otherwise.
Figure 5.3 gives an overview of our approach. A configuration begins in a
new state (state N) and constructs its application state using a state transfer proto-
col (stp). After transferring the state, the new configuration becomes ready (event
RDY) and makes a transition to an active state (state A). The transition refines a
sequence of zero or more pairs of transitions S2T2 and S2T3. In state A, the
configuration processes messages it receives (event RCV), using a request process-
ing protocol (rpp). Most transitions S2T1, S2T2, and S2T3 occur during request
processing. While being active, the configuration also runs an acknowledgment-
retransmission protocol (arp) to prevent omission, and a failure detection protocol
(fdp) to monitor its own health. When the failure detection protocol detects or sus-
pects a failure (event FDS), the configuration makes a transition to a passive state
(state P). In this state, the configuration does not modify its application state. It
triggers a change-of-configuration protocol (ccp) to determine a new configuration
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for the replicated server, and it serves state-transfer read-only requests for trans-
ferring the application state to the new configuration. Note that a new configu-
ration may have failed processes before it becomes active. In this case, the cur-
rent configuration will repeat the change-of-configuration protocol to determine
another configuration. When a new configuration becomes ready (event RDY),
the change-of-configuration protocol issues a clean command (event CLN) to
terminate all new configurations that have failed to become active. Finally, the
current configuration and those that received a clean command make a tran-
sition to a done state (state D)—where the processes terminate.
5.4.2 Replication
Traditionally, a replicated server would need 3t+ 1 replicas to tolerate t Byzan-
tine failures [117]. Later work [134] separates agreement from execution, reduc-
ing t of the replicas to witnesses. Witnesses do not hold application state nor
perform application operations. And thus they can run on cheaper machines.
Still, overall a replicated server requires 3t+ 1 members. This cost is high, espe-
cially in large scale distributed systems.
In order to reduce the replication cost, it is important to understand the ratio-
nale behind traditional approaches. A replicated server requires 3t+1 members,
because it is designed to operate uninterruptedly up to t failures. Informally, we
show why this is the case. For a formal treatment, see [47]. Any coordination
protocol must synchronize no more than n − t replicas in each step. Requir-
ing a higher number will lead to blocking when t failures occur. Because some
correct members may lag behind others, only n − 2t correct members are guar-
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anteed to have the most up-to-date state necessary for recovery from failures. In
a Byzantine environment, some necessary but unsignable information6 (such as
the recency of state) needs to be recovered from at least t+ 1 members to ensure
its authenticity. Thus, n− 2t ≥ t+ 1, or n ≥ 3t+ 1.
We observe that the design of Byzantine fault tolerant systems is rooted in
an effort to build aircraft control systems [131]. In such an environment, mask-
ing failures is important as the operation of an aircraft control system must not
be interrupted. However, when applying the same technique to asynchronous
systems, such as online services, the high replication cost is unjustified and un-
necessary. Even worse, the high replication cost is amplified with the system
size. In large scale asynchronous systems, it is more important to reduce the replication
cost than masking failures on the fly.
By trading off the failure masking capability in traditional state machine
replication approaches, we save t replicas in each replicated server. A repli-
cated server synchronizes all its members in every step. When some members
fail, the replicated server will block and needs to be reconfigured. But recon-
figurations are indistinguishable from delays in an asynchronous environment.
Because a replicated server synchronizes all members, at least n−t correct mem-
bers will have the most up-to-date state for recovery. By similar reasoning, we
need n− t ≥ t+ 1, or n ≥ 2t+ 1.
Among the 2t + 1 members, t + 1 are replicas and t are witnesses. Recall
that for simplicity we represent the application state a server p maintains as
Histp. To recover Histp, we can first find the length of the most recent history,
then find each request within that length. The length of the most recent history
6We informally call a piece of information D unsignable if there is no mapping f() such that
if S = f(D) at time T , then S = f(D) at any time T ′ > T .
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Approaches #replicas #witnesses Total
Traditional BFT SMR (e.g., PBFT [53]) 3t+ 1 0 3t+ 1
Separating Agreement from Execution [134] 2t+ 1 t 3t+ 1
Shuttle w/ Strong Adversary t + 1 t 2t + 1
Shuttle w/ Weak Adversary t + 1 0 t + 1
Table 5.1: Replication cost in BFT state machine replication approaches.
Bold entries high-light the approaches in this chapter.
is unsignable information and needs to have t + 1 members vouching for it.
Thus all 2t+ 1 members need to store the length of the most recent history. The
requests, on the other hand, can be signed. And so they may be recovered from
a single member. Thus, the replicas keep a copy of Histp, while the witnesses
only keep the length of the most recent history.
We can reduce this cost further under the weak adversary assumption. Ex-
ploiting the weak adversary assumption that processes do not truncate their
request histories, we eliminate the witnesses. As replicas, even faulty, do not
truncate their histories, the recovered history is the most recent one. Thus un-
der the weak adversary assumption, a replicated server comprises only t + 1
replicas.
Table 5.1 summarizes the replication cost of representative traditional ap-
proaches and Shuttle. All the listed approaches are BFT.
5.4.3 Digital Signatures and Proofs
Shuttle employs proofs to ensure that each protocol step only takes place if its
precondition holds. Each proof is constructed from digital signatures of a collec-
tion of processes. We use di to denote some data d signed by a process i. If pro-
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Type (Protocol) Precondition
Validity (rpp) the message is valid
Acceptance (rpp)∗ other members consider the proof valid
Order (rpp) no correct members process the message
in a different order
Acknowledgment (arp) the receiver has received and
processed the message
Checkpoint (gcp)∗ the checkpoint is recoverable
Misbehavior (fdp) the process has failed
Failure (ccp) configuration is to be replaced
Ready (ccp) configuration is ready
Table 5.2: Summary of proofs. ∗ These proofs are used in the optimized
request processing protocol (Section 5.6).
cess i is correct, then it is the only one that produces di. We use 〈S, {di | i ∈ S}〉
to denote a proof created by processes in S for some data d. We call processes in
S the signers.
Validity proofs, introduced in Section 5.3, are a type of proof. A correct mem-
ber checks a validity proof 〈Gp, {mi | i ∈ Gp}〉 for the precondition thatm is valid.
Other types of proof will be introduced when necessary. Table 5.2 summarizes
them for readability.
5.4.4 Data Structures and State Refinement
Each correct replica i in a replicated server Gp maintains a history copy Histpi ,
containing order proofs 〈Rp, {〈r, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉 where Rp is the set of replicas in
Gp, r is an input request, and c is an ordering number that is the index into the
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history. It also maintains an order counter ordpi (initially 0), and a variable state
p
i
that can assume a value in {new,active,passive,done}.
Each correct witness i in a replicated server Gp maintains a variable latestpi ,
which stores the latest order proof that the witness has seen, and a variable statepi
that can assume a value in {new,active,passive,done}.
To keep the state refinement concise, we use the following terms. A history
copy is consistent if (1) it has only order proofs of valid requests, and (2) the
ordering numbers in the order proofs form a continuous sequence of integers
starting from 0. A replica i (or Histpi ) vouches for a prefix H of a history copy if
Histpi is a prefix of H . A witness j (or latest
p
j ) vouches for a prefix H of a history
copy if latestpj appears in H .
The state of a server p in Figure 5.2 is refined as follows:
• Histp is defined as the shortest prefix H of a history copy among all con-
sistent Histpi such that there are n− t correct members vouching for H .7
• Unverifiedp is defined as the set of requests that any member of Gp received;
• InputSetp is defined as the set of requests that have passed the verification
step run by Gp (defined in Section 5.4.5);
• OutputSetp is defined as the set of requests that have passed the attestation
step run by Gp (defined in Section 5.4.5).
The state of a configuration of a replicated server Gp is defined as follows:
• new: if every member i has statepi = new;
7We ignore the difference between a history of requests and a history of order proofs that
contain requests.
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• active: if at least one member i has statepi = active, and every member j
has statepj be either new or active;
• passive: if at least one member i has statepi = passive, and no member j
has statepj = done;
• done: if at least one member i has statepi = done.
As indicated in Figure 5.3, when the state of a member is new, the member
participates in the state transfer and change-of-configuration protocols; when
the state is active, the member participates in the request processing, fail-
ure detection, and acknowledgment-retransmission protocols; when the state
is passive, the member participates in the change-of-configuration and state
transfer protocols; and when the state is done, the member terminates.
5.4.5 Transition Refinement and Request Processing Protocol
The specification in Figure 5.2 contains three transitions to be refined (italic
verbs denote actions):
• S2T1: replicated server Gp verifies a request and adds it to InputSetp if suc-
cessful;
• S2T2: replicated server Gp executes a request in InputSetp, appends the re-
quest to Histp, and attests and adds the results to OutputSetp;
• S2T3: a request from OutputSetp is added to Unverifiedq, where q is the des-
tination of the request.
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Note that each transition may comprise more than one action. Actions in the
same transition need to appear atomic. Also, attestation and verification need
to preserve properties AV1-3 defined in the first refinement. And finally, these
actions are performed by replicated servers. We call them group actions.
In this section we present a request processing protocol that refines the tran-
sitions in the common case, when there is no failure. The request processing
protocol defines the group actions based on individual actions, which are actions
performed by individual replicas or witnesses. For readability, we highlight ac-
tions to be defined in bold, and protocols in bold and italic. When the context is
clear, we simply mention the actions, without “group” or “individual”. Without
loss of generality, we define actions performed by a replicated server Gp.
The simplest actions are adding a request to a set. By the definitions of
InputSetp and OutputSetp, adding a request (to InputSetp or to OutputSetp) is
done automatically by verification or attestation, respectively. Adding a re-
quest in OutputSetp to Unverifiedq, where q is the destination of the request,
is having a member of Gp send the request to a member of Gq.
Verification of a request m from Gq is defined as the first correct individual
verification of the request—that is, the first correct member accepts that the re-
quest comes with a validity proof 〈Gq, {mi | i ∈ Gq}〉. The validity proof is,
similar to the first refinement, to enforce the precondition that the message is
valid.
The actions in S2T2 (executing, appending an input request, and attesting
an output message), require correct members to produce consistent results and
state changes. Because executep(., .) is deterministic, this requirement trans-
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lates to a precondition that no correct members process the input message in
a different order. We enforce this precondition by having each correct member
check an order proof (defined below) before processing any m. The following
ordering protocol orders input requests and produces order proofs. Ordering is
a no-op in the specification.
The ordering protocol follows the two-phase commit approach [99]. 8 A
replica, say l, is designated as a leader, which will receive and order the requests.
When l receives a request m, it sends 〈m, ordpl 〉 to the other replicas, asking them
to agree on the assigned order of m, and increments ordpl . When a replica i re-
ceives 〈m, c〉 with a valid m and an ordering number c = ordpi , replica i agrees
with the assigned order of m. It then signs the ordered request, increments ordpi ,
and returns the signed and ordered request to the leader. The leader compiles
an order proof, which is a tuple 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉. Note that since correct
replicas increment their order counters every request, no two order proofs of
different requests share the same ordering number.
For brevity we say that an order proof 〈S, {〈m1, c1〉i | i ∈ S}〉 is newer than an
order proof 〈S, {〈m2, c2〉i | i ∈ S}〉 if c1 > c2, and vice versa (for older). Similarly,
〈S, {〈m1, c1〉i | i ∈ S}〉 is at least as new as 〈S, {〈m2, c2〉i | i ∈ S}〉 if c1 ≥ c2, and
vice versa (for at least as old as).
Execution of a request m is defined as that the replica i, such that Histpi is the
shortest consistent history copy that is vouched for by t + 1 correct members,
evaluates the application function executep(m,Histpi ) to produce the results.9
We say that replica i individually executes m. Note that each replica that receives
8Unlike traditional approaches, we cannot use consensus protocols, such as [94, 57, 42], to
order requests, because using them requires each replicated server to have 3t+1 members [97].
9Note that correct replicas execute m in the same order and produce the same result. By
defining this way, we match the history-copy parameter with Histp.
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an order proof 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉 will individually execute m if it has exe-
cuted all requests with a lower ordering number.
Appending a request m into Histp at index c is defined by one correct replica
i enqueueing an order proof oproof = 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉 into Histpi and t+ 1
correct members j keeping oproof in Histpj (if replica), or in latest
p
j (if witness).
We say that the members individually append m. We require that (1) replicas and
witnesses only do so when they have individually appended every message
with an older order proof, and (2) witnesses only append m after replicas have
done so.
Attestation of an outputm is defined by each member individually attesting
m. A replica i individually attests m by signing m if (1) it receives both m and
the order proof oproof from which m was produced, (2) it has produced m, and
(3) it has oproof in Histpi . A witness j individually attests m by signing m if (1) it
receives both m and the order proof oproof from which m was produced, and (2)
latestpj holds oproof or a newer order proof. If all members are correct, Gp will
produce a validity proof for m after the attestation finishes. Note that:
• The signatures from the t + 1 replicas are to ensure that the request is
produced by a correct replica—and so, it is valid. We will prove this claim
in Section 5.5.
• The additional signatures from the witnesses are to ensure that m is re-
producible, when there are failures in the group, by making the causal
past [93] of m recoverable after a validity proof of m is formed.
Put together, the request processing protocol is as follows. Gp elects a leader
among the replicas. In the common case, when there are no failures, the leader
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Figure 5.4: The request processing protocol for t = 2. The witnesses only
exist under the strong adversary assumption.
receives requests and initiates the request processing protocol. When the leader
receives a request r, it verifies r. If verification succeeds, the leader orders r to
form an order proof oproof = 〈Rp, {〈r, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉. The leader executes r and
produces a set of output messages M . It sends r, M and oproof to all replicas.
Each replica verifies r, executes r (if verification succeeds), appends oproof to its
history copy, attests each output message in M , and returns the signed output
messages to the leader. The leader compiles M ′, which is a set of messages in
M , each being signed by all replicas. The leader then sends oproof and M ′ to all
witnesses. Each witness stores oproof (i.e., appends r) and attests the messages
in M ′ if they are signed by all replicas. Note that this check is to ensure that wit-
nesses only append r after all replicas have done so. The witnesses then return
the output messages in M ′, each has been signed, to the leader. The leader com-
piles a validity proof for each output message and sends it to the destination.
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Figure 5.4 illustrates the request processing protocol. Note that while execu-
tion, appending and attestation interleave, they appear atomic because of the
local order of performing the individual actions. The use of outputs attested
by the replicas in the appending action at the witnesses is only an optimiza-
tion that enforces a precondition (witnesses only append a request after replicas
have done so) while avoiding an additional type of proof.
5.4.6 Configuration Management
A replicated server deals with failures by changing its configuration. If a failure
is provable and t ≥ 1, we either need to remove the failed member from the
group and decrement t or need to replace the failed member by a new process.
In case of unprovable failures, we have to replace a subset of members that have
been suspected of failing. Configurations are managed by a BFT service called
Olympus, denoted O. Note that O is also a group of processes.
Olympus is responsible for assigning processes to each replicated server ini-
tially. When a failure occurs, Olympus is also responsible for assigning a new
configurations to the failed group as long as it has t or fewer failed members.
More formally, Olympus
• maintains a list of processes available in the system,
• maintains a map from replicated server identifiers (RSIDs) to configuration
representations,
• implements an Olympus function that computes, signs, and outputs a con-
figuration representation for an RSID, a CID, and optionally a proof of
misbehavior.
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Note that Olympus needs to verify that an input comes from the replicated
server with the given RSID.
Our configuration management mechanism follows the publish/subscibe ap-
proach [114]. Olympus manages the configurations of all replicated servers.
Each replicated server subscribes to its neighbors’ configuration representa-
tions, posted by Olympus. A member may publish a failure detection or sus-
picion event (FDS) when this event happens in the failure detection protocol
(Section 5.4.7). We call such a publication a failure publication. Also, members
of a replicated server may publish their state recovered from the state transfer
protocol. We call this publication a ready publication. Upon receiving a pub-
lication, Olympus verifies that the publication is correctly signed (i.e., by one
member in a failure publication and by all members in a ready publication, and
all signatures are valid). For a ready publication, Olympus also verifies that the
members recover the same state. Upon success, Olympus creates a failure proof
〈O, {〈FAILURE RSID,CID〉i | i ∈ O}〉 for a failure publication, or a ready proof
〈O, {〈READY RSID,CID〉i | i ∈ O}〉 for a ready publication and propagates them
to all their subscribers through their leaders. A RDY event occurs when Olympus
propagates a ready proof.
5.4.7 Failure Detection Protocol
A member runs the failure detection protocol when it is active. The member
monitors messages and raises a detection or suspicion (FDS) upon an unex-
pected event. In many cases, failures are unprovable. The lack of a proof of
misbehavior enables any process (possibly Byzantine) to raise an FDS event.
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We contain that malicious behavior by limiting that a process can only publish an
FDS event of its own group. Two types of unexpected events may happen:
1. Corrupted messages: A message that has been authenticated to have been
sent from a sender but its contents is not what it should be. For example, a
message carrying a malformed order proof and verified to have been sent
by the leader indicates that the leader has failed. Note that a message that
cannot be authenticated does not raise a detection or suspicion, as it may
have been sent from an attacker in the network.
2. Lost messages: A member expects some particular messages in each step
of the protocol. When the member times out on waiting for a message, it
raises a suspicion. For example, during the processing of a message m,
• a member can time out on waiting for an order proof 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈
Rp}〉 after it has signed 〈m, c〉;
• a leader can time out while collecting signatures for an order proof
〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉;
• and so on...
When a member i of Gp raises an FDS event, it changes statepi from active to
passive. The replicated server progresses no further. And eventually other
members will change their state from active to passive as well.
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5.4.8 Acknowledgment-Retransmission Protocol
We devise an acknowledgment-retransmission protocol for two purposes. First, it is
to prevent omission, which is caused by malicious leaders. And second, it is to
enforce the following property (for Liveness):
• AR. If Gp sends m to Gq, then either m is in Histq or Gp will resend m to Gq.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that Gp in configuration S is sending m
to Gq in configuration D. The protocol runs on both sender and receiver sides.
On the sender side, each correct member sets a timer when it (indi-
vidually) attests m. The member waits for either an acknowledgment proof,
〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉, or a failure proof 〈O, {〈FAILURE q,D〉i | i ∈ O}〉. The
acknowledgment proof ensures that the receiver has received and processed the mes-
sage (a precondition) before the sender stops sending m.
An active Gp forces Gq to return either an acknowledgment proof or a
failure proof by retransmission: The leader of Gp sets a timer waiting for
〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉 after sending m. When it times out, the leader broad-
castsm to t+1 members in Gq. Then the leader waits again (but without timeout)
for either 〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉 or 〈O, {〈FAILURE q,D〉i | i ∈ O}〉. At least
one correct member among the t + 1 will either acknowledge the message or
publish an FDS event (details below).
If the leader of Gp receives an acknowledgment proof 〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉
or a failure proof 〈O, {〈FAILURE q,D〉i | i ∈ O}〉, it will forward the proof to the
members. They will cancel their timer upon receipt.
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If Gp receives 〈O, {〈FAILURE q,D〉i | i ∈ O}〉, it will wait for a ready proof
〈O, {〈READY q,D′〉i | i ∈ O}〉 (D′ is the configuration identifier of a new config-
uration of Gq) and retry sending m as if it is sending m the first time.
If a member in Gp times out before receiving 〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉 or
〈O, {〈FAILURE q,D〉i | i ∈ O}〉, it suspects that a failure has occurred in its
own group—for instance, the leader omitted sending the output. The member
triggers an FDS event. After a new configuration S ′ becomes active, the new
leader re-initiates the attestation for each output and resends the outputs with
their validity proofs to the destinations.10 If a destination has already processed
a request, it will just acknowledge the request without executing it.
On the receiver side, if Gq is active, its leader will create 〈ACK m〉 when exe-
cuting m, collect signatures from the members during the appending step, and
return 〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉 to the sender’s leader.
When a member receives m, it individually verifies the request. If m passes
the member’s verification, the member forwards m to the leader and sets a
timer. The leader handles the request as if it has come directly from Gp until the
last step. Instead of sending 〈Gq, {〈ACKm〉i | i ∈ Gq}〉 to Gp, the leader forwards
it to all the members from which it received m. Those members will cancel their
timer and forward the acknowledgment proof to the leader of Gp. If, instead, a
member times out, it will publish an FDS event.
10For efficiency, one may want to keep track of the outputs that have not been acknowledged
and only re-attest and resend those.
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5.4.9 State Transfer Protocol
The state transfer protocol is to transfer the application state (i.e., the history) from
a passive configuration to a new configuration, such that the following property
is preserved (for Safety):
• ST. If H is a history of Gp at time T , then H is recoverable at any time
T ′ > T—that is, the state transfer protocol will read a history H ′ out of
the configuration of Gp at time T ′ such that H is a prefix of H ′.
Without loss of generality, suppose the current and passive configuration is
C, and the new configuration is C ′. The leader in C ′ queries the state of all
members in C. Replicas in C reply with their history copy. Each witness in C
replies with the last order proof it has witnessed. The leader in C ′ waits for n− t
pair-wise non-conflicting responses and picks the longest history copy among
them. Two responses are non-conflicting if (1) they have no history copy that is
not consistent, (2) they do not contain any two order proofs of the same request
but different orderings, and (3) a history copy (response from a replica) must
be vouched for by a latest order proof (response from a witness). The longest
history copy is the state of the new configuration.
The leader propagates the n − t non-conflicting responses to all members.
From the n − t non-conflicting responses, the replicas derive the new history,
and the witnesses derive the latest order proof. Each member computes its sig-
nature on the hash of the n− t responses and returns the signature to the leader
in a ready message. The leader publishes the hash and the signatures from all
members in a ready publication. The hash and the signatures ensure that Olym-
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pus only sends a ready proof after a all members in a new configuration have
started from the same state.
5.4.10 Change-of-Configuration Protocol
The change-of-configuration protocol links the failure detection and state transfer
protocols together to help a replicated server deal with failures. The protocol
starts in a passive configuration and produces a new configuration. Suppose a
replicated server Gp that is in a configuration C triggers the protocol:
• A member (called a detector) publishes an FDS event by sending Olym-
pus its RSID p, CID C, and optionally a proof of misbehavior. Olym-
pus verifies the data to make sure that the publication comes from a pro-
cess in configuration C. It then creates and propagates a failure proof
〈O, {〈FAILURE p, C〉i | i ∈ O}〉 to all subscribers of Gp.
• Based on p, C and optionally a proof of misbehavior submitted by the de-
tector, Olympus allocates processes for a new configuration C ′. It signs
and sends the representation of configuration C ′ to the leader of configu-
ration C ′.
• Configuration C ′ transfers the state from configuration C using the state
transfer protocol with an additional detail. The leader of C ′ passes the
configuration presentation of C ′ (signed by Olympus) to the other mem-
bers along with the recovered state (i.e., the n−t non-conflicting responses
from C). Each member in configuration C ′ verifies the configuration pre-
sentation to ensure it is in C ′ before adopting the state.
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• When Olympus gathers all n ready messages from C ′ that contain
the same hash value, Olympus creates and propagates a ready proof
〈O, {〈READY p, C ′〉i | i ∈ O}〉 to all Gp’s subscribers, who will then resume
normal operation of the application. When Olympus sends a ready proof,
we say that a RDY event occurs.
• Olympus sets a timer after computing configuration C ′. If it times out be-
fore receiving a ready publication, it will allocate another configuration
and repeat the change-of-configuration protocol. When Olympus propa-
gates a ready proof, it also cleans up configurations that have failed to
become ready by sending a clean command to all processes in that con-
figuration. We say that a CLN event occurs. The processes that receive a
CLN command will terminate.
5.4.11 Timeouts
We use different timeouts for different purposes, and they need to be set prop-
erly, otherwise the system will be unable to make progress. In particular, the
leader of a sender group has a retransmission timeout ∆T after which it broadcasts
the un-acknowledged request. Each member in a receiver group that receives a
retransmitted request maintains a receive-omission timeout ∆R after which it pub-
lish a failure suspicion event. And each member in a sender group maintains a
send-omission timeout ∆S after which it publishes a failure suspicion event. When
the system is asynchronous, we cannot guarantee any timing. But after GST, we
need to ensure that the leader allows sufficient time for the receiver to process a
request and return an acknowledgment. Also, a receiving member in a receiver
group must allow enough time for its group to process the request and return
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an acknowledgment. And a member in a sender group must allow enough time
for the leader to retry and for the receiver group to publish an failure suspicion
event.
After GST, if we let
• δP be the request processing time, from when a process (leader of a sender
group or a receiving member of a receiver group) sends a request until it
receives an acknowledgment;
• δF be the failure publication time, from when a process publishes an FDS
event until all interested processes receive a failure proof;
• δA be the attestation time, from when a member in the sender group indi-
vidually attests an output until the output leaves the sender group;
then we need
∆T > δP (5.1)
∆R > δP (5.2)
∆S > ∆T + ∆R + δF + δA +  (5.3)
where  accounts for the time from when the retransmission timeout ∆T expires
(at leader) until t+ 1 members in the receiver group receive the request.
When equations 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 hold, the following property holds:
• TO. After GST, there will be no failure suspicion or detection in Gp, unless
some members of Gp itself fail.
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5.5 Correctness
We need to show that Shuttle preserves Safety and Liveness even when there
are failures. Throughout the proof we assume that each replicated server contains
at most t failed members at any time.
5.5.1 Safety.
Lemma 5.5.1. Correct replicas produce valid messages.
Proof. We will show the lemma by induction on the number of messages pro-
duced by correct replicas (of all replicated servers).
Base case: We need to show that if m is the first message produced by a correct
replica, then m is valid.
Suppose m is produced by a replica of a replicated server Gp upon an input
m′. Because m is the first message produced by a correct replica, m′ cannot be
produced by any correct replica. m′ cannot be produced by a faulty replica,
either, because in such case m′ would not have enough signatures to form a
validity proof and would fail the verification. Thus, m′ must be an external
input.
By assumption, all external inputs are valid. And since m′ is valid, m =
executep(m′, []) is valid by definition.
Induction hypothesis (IH): Suppose the first c messages produced by correct
replicas are valid, where c ≥ 1.
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Inductive case: We need to show that the (c+1)th message is valid. Let us call it
m, and suppose thatm is produced by replica i of p, based on an inputm′. LetH
be the history copy of replica i. We claim that H contains only valid messages.
Proof of claim: Suppose not, letm′′ be an invalid message inH . By definition,
m′′ cannot be an external message (*). Before appending m′′ into H , replica i
must have checked that m′′ has a validity proof (**). (*) and (**) imply that some
correct replica has produced m′′. But this contradicts to the IH, which implies
that all messages produced by correct replicas beforem is valid. Hence the claim
is correct.
There are three cases: m′ is external, m′ is produced by a correct replica, and
m′ is produced by a faulty replica but not by a correct one.
• m′ is external. As m′ is valid and H contains only valid messages, m =
executep(m′, H) is valid by definition.
• m′ is produced by a correct replica. Because m′ is produced before m, m′
is valid by the IH. Then by definition, m = executep(m′, H) is valid.
• m′ is produced by a faulty replica, but not by a correct one. This means
correct replicas do not sign m′. And so m′ does not have a validity proof
to pass the verification. Thus this case cannot happen.
We conclude that m is valid. And by induction, correct replicas produce valid
messages.
Lemma 5.5.2 (AV1). A replicated server Gp attests a message m = 〈p, q, payload〉 only
if m is valid.
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Proof. By definition, m is attested only if all members in replicated server Gp
have individually attested m. That is, a correct replica in group Gp must have
produced m. By Lemma 5.5.1, m is valid.
Lemma 5.5.3 (AV2). A message m = 〈p, q, payload〉 is successfully verified only if m
is attested by replicated server Gp.
Proof. This is correct by the construction of verification: verification only suc-
ceeds when m has a validity proof 〈Gp, {mi | i ∈ Gp}〉—meaning that m has been
attested by replicated server Gp.
Lemma 5.5.4. Histp contains only valid requests.
Proof. By definition, Gp appends a request r into Histp only if every correct
replica i has individually appended r to Histpi .
A correct replica i individually appends r to Histpi only if r comes with an
order proof 〈Rp, {〈r, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉, for some number c. In the ordering instance
that produces 〈Rp, {〈r, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉, each replica individually verifies r before
producing a signature for 〈r, c〉. If r is external, it is valid by definition. If r
is from another replica q, it must have been attested by replicated server Gq by
Lemma 5.5.3. And by Lemma 5.5.2, Gq attests r only if r is valid.
Lemma 5.5.5. InputSetp contains only valid requests.
Proof. By definition, a request m from a replicated server q is added into
InputSetp if a correct member in group Gp has individually verified m.
A correct member individually verifies m only if m has a validity proof
〈Gq, {mi | i ∈ Gq}〉. This means a correct replica in group Gq must have produced
and signed m. By Lemma 5.5.1, m is valid.
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Lemma 5.5.6. OutputSetp contains only valid requests.
Proof. By definition, Gp adds a request m into OutputSetp only if all members
of group Gp has been individually attested m. One of them must be a correct
replica.
A correct replica individually attests m only if it has produced m. By
Lemma 5.5.1, m is valid.
Lemma 5.5.7. If there are two order proofs 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉 and
〈Rp, {〈m′, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉, then m = m′.
Proof. There must be a correct replica in Rp that signs both 〈m, c〉 and 〈m′, c〉.
Because a correct replica i only signs some pair 〈r, c〉 when ordpi = c, and it
increments ordpi after signing, m must be the same as m′.
Lemma 5.5.8. If i and j are correct replicas in the same configuration of a replicated
server Gp, then either Histpi is a prefix of Histpj or vice versa.
Proof. By the state transfer protocol, in order for a configuration to become
ready all members have to produce a signature of the same initial state (t + 1
non-conflicting responses). This means when a configuration becomes active,
all correct replicas start from the same state—i.e., Histpi = Hist
p
j . During the
request processing protocol, a replica enqueue the cth request, say m, into its
history only if it receives an order proof 〈m, c〉. And by Lemma 5.5.7, there is no
valid order proofs 〈m, c〉 and 〈m′, c〉where m 6= m′. Thus replicas i and j cannot
enqueue different requests to Histpi and Hist
p
j at the same position. And so the
lemma holds.
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For convenience, in the following proofs we will use correct history to call a
copy of the Histp at a correct replica (under the strong adversary assumption)
or a copy of Histp that contains only valid requests (under the weak adversary
assumption).
Lemma 5.5.9 (ST). If H is a history of Gp at time T , H is recoverable at any time
T ′ > T .
Proof. We need to show that the state transfer protocol run at time T ′ will re-
trieve a history H ′ such that H is a prefix of H ′. Let C be the configuration
at time T . It suffices to show that the state transfer protocol retrieves such H ′
from C. In case the configuration at time T ′ is not C, the result still holds by
transitivity.
Recall that the state transfer protocol retrieves n−t non-conflicting responses
from C and lets H ′ be the longest history copy among the responses. By the
definition of non-conflicting, the H ′ is vouched for by the n− t responses. And
by the definition of a history, H is shorter than H ′. Finally, by Lemma 5.5.8, H is
a prefix of H ′, as desired.
Lemma 5.5.10. If H = Histp at time T and H ′ = Histp at time T ′, where T ′ > T , then
H is a prefix of H ′.
Proof. There are two cases: H and H ′ are from the same configuration, and not.
Case 1: By definition, H is the shortest correct history at time T and H ′ is the
shortest correct history at time T ′ > T . This and Lemma 5.5.8 imply that H is a
prefix of any correct history at time T . And since the request processing protocol
only enqueues requests into history copies, no correct history is shortened from
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time T to time T ′. Thus, H is also a prefix of any correct history at time T ′, and
this includes H ′.
Case 2: By Lemma 5.5.9, any history value of a configuration is a prefix of the
initial history of the next configuration, as it is recovered by the state transfer
protocol. Applying this repeatedly over the configurations we haveH is a prefix
of the initial history of the configuration where H ′ is read. By this, case 1, and
the fact that the prefix quality is transitive, H is a prefix of H ′.
Lemma 5.5.11. If I = InputSetp at time T and I ′ = InputSetp at time T ′, where
T ′ > T , then I ⊆ I ′.
Proof. By definition, Gp puts a request into InputSetp after it has verified the re-
quest. Also, the protocols do not remove any request out of InputSetp. Thus,
InputSetp always expands, as desired.
Lemma 5.5.12. If O = OutputSetp at time T and O′ = OutputSetp at time T ′, where
T ′ > T , then O ⊆ O′.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 5.5.11.
Theorem 5.5.13. Shuttle preserves Safety.
Proof. The theorem holds by Lemmas 5.5.4, 5.5.5, 5.5.6, 5.5.10, 5.5.11, 5.5.12.
5.5.2 Liveness
Recall that the system model we are interested in has the following assumptions:
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• There is a Global Stabilization Time (GST) after which the system is synchronous
and no more processes fail.
• There are at most t failures that have occurred in any configuration.
Lemma 5.5.14. Correct members in a configuration that starts start from the same
state.
Proof. This follows from the state transfer protocol. Before a configuration be-
comes active, it is required to collect a signature from each member on the same
n− t responses from which it computes its state.
Lemma 5.5.15 (AR). If a replicated server Gp sends a valid output message m to Gq,
either m is in Histq or Gp will resend m to Gq.
Proof. A replicated server Gp only sends m if it has appended r to Histp, where
m = executep(r,H) for some history value H of Histp. By Lemma 5.5.9, [r | H]
is recoverable. And so when Gp is reconfigured, it will re-execute r and resend
m. (*)
Now supposem is not in Histq, we need to show that Gp will resendm. When
m is not in Histq, Gq must have not acknowledged m. By the acknowledgment-
retransmission protocol, Gp will broadcast m and set a timer. When it times out
and Gq has not acknowledged m, Gp will be reconfigured, and it will resend m
by (*).
Lemma 5.5.16 (TO). After GST, there will be no failure suspicion or detection in Gp,
unless some members of Gp itself fail.
Proof. Suppose that after GST all members in Gp are correct. And suppose that
a member i in Gp publishes an FDS event.
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Member i must have timed out after ∆R, waiting for an acknowledgment
from the leader, or after ∆S , waiting for an acknowledgment from another repli-
cated server, say Gp. It cannot be the former case, as ∆R > δP (Equation 5.2)
allows enough time for Gp to process the request and send the acknowledgment
to i. It cannot be the latter case, either, as ∆S > ∆T + ∆R + δF +  (Equation 5.3).
In the worst case (Gq does not return an acknowledgment), ∆T allows the leader
to rebroadcast the request;  allows enough time for the retransmitted request
reaches t+1 members in Gq; ∆R allows a correct member in Gq to publish an FDS
event, and δF allows the failure publication to propagate to member i. Thus,
neither case can happen, contradicting the assumption.
Lemma 5.5.17. After GST, a reconfiguration triggered by a member will terminate
with a configuration containing only correct processes.
Proof. Reconfiguration involves the following steps: failure publication, con-
figuration assignment, state transfer, and ready publication. Failure publica-
tion terminates because sending a message to Olympus terminates after GST.
Configuration assignment terminate by the assumption about Olympus. State
transfer involves pulling the state from n − t members of a configuration and
passing it to other members. The pulling step terminates because there are at
most t failures in any configuration. The passing step terminates because the
system become synchronous after GST. Finally, ready publication terminates be-
cause (1) the system becomes synchronous after GST, and (2) all members in the
new configuration start from the same state (Lemma 5.5.14) and their ready
messages trigger Olympus to send a ready proof. So all the steps terminate.
Furthermore, Olympus in the configuration assignment step assigns all correct
processes to the new configuration (as after GST no more process fails, and all
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failed processes are detected.) Thus reconfiguration terminates with a configu-
ration containing all correct processes.
Lemma 5.5.18. After GST, a correct replicated server Gp that is not reconfigured will
succeed in ordering a request (i.e., the leader will be able to compile a complete order
proof of the request.)
Proof. First, from Lemma 5.5.14 we have that any active configuration of Gp
starts with ordpi = ord
p
j , for all replicas i and j.
Second, we need to show that the request processing protocol preserves an
invariant that when a replica i in a correct configuration of Gp receives a pair
〈m, c〉, then ordpi = c. This is true because (1) the leader sends pairs 〈m, c〉 to the
replicas in the order of c, (2) the links transmit messages in FIFO order, and (3)
the replicas increment their order counter after each receipt.
Therefore, when the leader of Gp sends any pair 〈m, c〉 to the replicas, the
replicas will compute their signatures over 〈m, c〉 and return it to the leader.
The leader collects enough signatures to compile a order proof 〈Rp, {〈m, c〉i | i ∈
Rp}〉, and the ordering finishes.
Lemma 5.5.19 (AV3). After GST, if Gp is in an active configuration, then its attestation
and verification steps terminate.
Proof. When Gp is correct, verification is a local action at the leader of Gp. Local
actions terminate because it is after GST.
Attestation involves a number of message transmissions and local computa-
tions, which terminate after GST. The only condition is that the replicas produce
the same messages. This is guaranteed because the replicas start from the same
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state (Lemma 5.5.14), ordering terminates (Lemma 5.5.18), and the replicas exe-
cute requests in the order enforced by order proofs.
Lemma 5.5.20. After GST, if Gp is in an active configuration, then it terminates on the
appending steps.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of attestation.
Lemma 5.5.21. After GST, if Gp is in an active configuration, r ∈ InputSetp, and
r /∈ Histp, then Gp will execute r, add the results to OutputSetp, and append r to Histp.
Proof. When r ∈ InputSetp, r must be valid by Lemma 5.5.5. Lemma 5.5.15 im-
plies that once r ∈ InputSetp, Gp will receive r again even after it is reconfigured.
Thus it is sufficient to show that if Gp is in an active configuration and receives
a valid r, it will execute r, add the results to OutputSetp, and append r to Histp.
First, by Lemma 5.5.16, Gp will not be reconfigured. So, it will go through
the processing steps as follows. First, r is sent to the leader of Gp. The leader
will successfully verifies r, as r is valid and the leader is correct. The leader
initiates the ordering protocol, which will succeed by Lemma 5.5.18 and yield
an order proof oproof = 〈Rp, {〈r, c〉i | i ∈ Rp}〉 for some c. The leader then sends
oproof to all replicas, which will individually execute r—hence Gp executes r.
The other request processing steps, namely attesting, and appending, succeed
by Lemma 5.5.19, and Lemma 5.5.20, respectively. Thus, the lemma holds.
Lemma 5.5.22. If r ∈ InputSetp and r /∈ Histp, then Gp will execute r, add the results
to OutputSetp, and append r to Histp.
Proof. Suppose r is from Gq. Assume by contradiction, the lemma does not hold.
Since Gp does not append r to Histp, Gq will resend r to Gp (by Lemma 5.5.15).
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By the acknowledgment-retransmission protocol, the resends alternate between
sending r to a leader of a new configuration and retransmitting r to t+ 1 mem-
bers of the same configuration. Because Gp does not acknowledge r, a correct
member in Gp will publish an FDS event. Similar reconfigurations are repeated
as long as Gp does not acknowledge r. But after GST, Gp will get a configuration
with all correct processes (Lemma 5.5.17). And the assumption contradicts to
Lemma 5.5.21.
Lemma 5.5.23. If m = 〈p, q, payload〉, m ∈ OutputSetp, and m /∈ InputSetq, then Gq
will add m to its InputSetq.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the lemma does not hold. By definition,
m is only in OutputSetp if Gp has attested m. Since m is not in InputSetq, Gq has
not acknowledged m. Some correct member in Gp will time out and publish an
FDS event. These steps repeat as long as the lemma does not hold. But after
GST, Gp will get a configuration will all correct processes (Lemma 5.5.17). This
configuration will send m with a validity proof 〈Gp, {mi | i ∈ Gp}〉 to Gq when
m ∈ OutputSetp.
By Lemma 5.5.15, either (1) Gq appends m to Histq or (2) Gp retransmits m.
In case 1, Gq must have verified m before appending it to Histq—meaning Gq
must have added m to InputSetq. In case 2, the leader of Gq retransmits m by
broadcasting to t+ 1 members of Gq. A correct one will time out and Gq will get
reconfigured. This can only repeat until GST, when Gq gets a configuration of all
correct processes and the system is synchronous. We get back to case 1, where
Gq adds m to InputSetq.
Both cases contradict to the assumption. Hence the lemma must hold.
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Theorem 5.5.24. Shuttle preserves Liveness.
Proof. Liveness holds by Lemmas 5.5.22 and 5.5.23.
5.6 Practical Considerations
The Shuttle protocol presented in Section 5.4 achieves our goal of reducing the
replication cost. But the protocol still involves high computation and commu-
nication costs. In this section we consider a few optimizations and implementa-
tion issues that make the protocol more practical.
5.6.1 Chain Communication
The Shuttle protocol involves several rounds of group communication, in which
a message is passed from the leader to every member in the group. Usually
broadcast implements such communication. However, given that we have a
small group size (usually t = 1 or t = 2) communication in a chain pattern
reduces the bandwidth consumption to approximately half compared to broad-
casting, while still maintaining acceptable latency.
A group, or replicated server, is organized into a chain, called group chain.
A group chain comprises a chain of replicas, called replica chain, followed by a
chain of witnesses, called witness chain. Each chain begins with a head and ends
with a tail. Note that within a group, the head of the replica chain is also the
head of the group chain, and the tail of the witness chain is also the tail of the
group chain. The head of a group chain also serves as the leader of the group.
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Processes communicate by exchanging shuttles. A shuttle comprises mul-
tiple fields, including one or more proofs. Some of the proofs may be incom-
plete, meaning that they do not carry a signature from every signer. As a shuttle
passes through a chain, the members may check the shuttle’s contents and add
signatures to the proofs. Proofs will be complete, meaning that they carry a signa-
ture from every signer, when their shuttle reaches the end of the chain. Shuttles
passing between groups contain no incomplete proofs.
5.6.2 Digital Signatures
A digital signature needs to guarantee that it is verifiable by correct processes
and unforgeable by faulty ones. Depending on the failure assumption, different
methods can implement a signature. For example:
Assumption Public-key Secret-key
Strong adversary RSA MAC
Weak adversary CRC N/A
Public-key signatures provide the guarantees we need. For weak adversaries,
CRC efficiently implements public-key signatures. But for strong adversaries,
RSA may be too expensive for frequent use. Message authentication code
(MAC) is more efficient, but it only implements secret-key signatures. Unlike
public-key, secret-key signatures are not verifiable by all correct processes.
MAC signatures, however, can efficiently simulate RSA signatures for mes-
sages sent between two groups in Shuttle. Each process instead of generating
an RSA signature generates a vector of MAC signatures, one for each process
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in the destination group. A proof changes from a vector of RSA signatures,
one per each signer, to a matrix of MAC signatures, where each source process
contributes a row, and each destination process verifies a column.
Because a vector of MACs may be verified by some processes but not others,
so may a proof be. In general, it requires to have an external service to simulate
equivalent properties as RSA signatures’ using MACs, as proposed in [35, 62].
The external service, depending on how it is deployed, may incur extra commu-
nication and/or replication costs. In Shuttle we avoid these costs by weakening
the property. We only require a correct member be able to verify a proof when
another correct member can and the replicated server is correct. If the repli-
cated server fails, correct members may disagree on the validity of a proof. In
this case, a member will trigger a reconfiguration to fix the replicated server.
Proofs can be used internally to a group (internal proofs) or used between
groups (external proofs). For internal proofs, namely order proofs, each member
verifies every MAC signature in its column and triggers a reconfiguration if any
of them is invalid. The protocol is the same as when public-key signatures are
used.
For external proofs, namely validity proofs and acknowledgment proofs, we
need to add a pre-verification step to ensure that a correct member accepts an ex-
ternal proof if others accept the proof. This precondition is enforced by acceptance
proofs. To ensure that every external proof is verified by at least one correct
member, we require t + 1 members to participate in the pre-verification step.
The pre-verification step is as follows:
• Each external proof (i.e., validity or acknowledgment proof) is signed by
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every member in the source group for some t+ 1 members in the destina-
tion group,11 containing n rows and t+ 1 columns of MAC signatures.
• Each of the t+1 members in the destination subgroup individually verifies
all n MAC entries in its column. Upon success, the member produces
t+ 1 MAC signatures for the replicas (in case of validity proofs) or n MAC
signatures for all the members (in case of acknowledgment proofs).
In the verification step, each participating member verifies all its t + 1 MAC
entries in the acceptance proof.
Note that because pre-verification lets any member unilaterally discard ex-
ternal proofs, using MAC signatures in retransmitted validity proofs would dis-
able the retransmission-acknowledgment protocol from exposing omission fail-
ures in the destination. Therefore we keep using RSA in retransmitted validity
proofs. 12 Retransmission is triggered by a member (rather than the leader), who
sends a shuttle to collect RSA signatures from other members.
5.6.3 Early Request Processing
In the Shuttle protocol, order proofs help to enforce a precondition that no cor-
rect members process inputs in a different order. In general this property re-
quires all replicas to complete an order proof before letting any member act on
it.
However, when using the chain pattern for communication, a member can
11Any t + 1 members work. But a particular subgroup may be chosen for optimization pur-
poses.
12Alternatively, an external signature service approach [35, 62] also works.
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Figure 5.5: The optimized request processing protocol for t = 2. The wit-
nesses only exist under the strong adversary assumption.
let its successors know the order of its execution. Thus an incomplete order
proof still enforces the same precondition if it carries a signature of each preced-
ing replica. A member can process an input with an incomplete order proof as
it is passing through the chain.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the optimized request processing protocol. The num-
bers present different steps that the processes take:13
1. A request, say m, comes to the head h of the chain. The head
• verifies the validity proof that comes with m;
• executes m and produces outputs;
• creates and signs an order proof 〈m, ordph〉, increments ordph, creates
13CRC, RSA, and internal validity proof are all called validity proof for convenience. Under
the weak adversary assumption, these are CRC validity proofs. Under the strong adversary
assumption, these are acceptance proofs for the first attempt and are RSA validity proofs for
retries.
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and signs an acknowledgment proof for m, and creates and signs a
validity proof for each output.
2. Each non-head replica i
• verifies the validity proof that comes with m;
• verifies that the order proof contains a counter equal to ordpi and a
valid signature from each replica preceding i;
• executes m and produces outputs;
• signs the order proof, increments ordpi , signs the acknowledgment
proof of m, and signs the validity proof of each output.
3. Each witness i
• verifies that the order proof contains a counter equal to ordpi and a
valid signature from each replica;
• increments ordpi , signs the acknowledgment proof of m, and signs the
validity proof of each output.
The tail of the group chain will send the acknowledgment proof to the head of
the source group of m and send the outputs along with their validity proofs to
their destinations.
It is straightforward that the optimized request processing protocol refines
the server specification in Figure 5.2 in the same way as the request processing
protocol in Section 5.4.5 does. Furthermore, each member enforces the same
precondition before performing an individual action:
• Before executing a request, appending it to the local history copy, and at-
testing resulting outputs, a member ensures that (1) the request is valid
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(by a validity proof as before), (2) no correct members do so in a different
order (by an incomplete order proof, as explained above);
• A witness only individually appends a request if all replicas have done so
(by the chain ordering).
Therefore the optimized protocol also works.
5.6.4 Tolerating Client Failures
We have been assuming that requests from clients are valid. While it is un-
necessary for a client to submit validity proofs with its requests, it still needs
to sign its requests so that they cannot be forged by faulty processes. For this
purpose, we treat each client as a singleton group. Under the weak adversary
assumption, the clients sign each of their requests by a CRC checksum. Under
the strong adversary assumption, the clients sign each of their requests by a vec-
tor of t+ 1 MAC signatures. The request processing protocol works as it is now.
Note that the pre-verification step ensures that a request coming with a vector
of MAC signatures would consistently pass or consistently fail the individual
verification performed at the correct members.
5.6.5 Large Requests
Large requests consume much bandwidth, and their transmissions easily be-
come the bottleneck in distributed applications. To minimize bandwidth con-
sumption, we limit sending large requests only to where it is absolutely neces-
sary.
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On the sender side, we prevent each replica from sending a full request to
another replica, because the other replica also produces the request. Only the
tail replica needs to send full requests, but it has two options. It sends the re-
quests either directly to their destinations, or to the head witness. The former
option consumes lower bandwidth overall, but it requires the destination to
garbage collect full requests with incomplete validity proofs. We choose the
latter option as it is simpler, even though it consumes more bandwidth (at the
witnesses, which are not the bottleneck).
On the receiver side, only replicas need full requests for execution. We limit
sending full requests to each replica once (under fault-free conditions), by select-
ing the replicas as the subgroup that performs the pre-verification step. During
the pre-verification step, the replicas extract the full request. They compute the
acceptance and order proofs based on the hashes of the full requests, which is
actually faster than based on the requests themselves.
Figure 5.6 presents the request processing protocol with the pre-verification
step. Note that this step only exists under the strong adversary assumption,
when MAC signatures are used.
5.6.6 Garbage Collection
Until now the Shuttle protocol keeps an infinite history as state. The garbage
collection protocol presented in this section helps to keep state manageable by
replacing the history with a checkpoint and a log.
A log is, similar to a history, a queue of requests. Unlike a history, a log has
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Figure 5.6: The request processing protocol for t = 2. The pre-verification
step presented here is necessary only under the strong adver-
sary assumption.
a bounded length. A log stores a suffix of a history. When a log is full, new
requests are suspended.
A replica computes a checkpoint everyK requests and truncates its log when
it learns that other replicas have computed the same checkpoint.
For the protocol below, we call a request stable if all its resulting outputs
have been acknowledged. The last acknowledgment proof that makes a request
r stable is called the stabilizing acknowledgment proof of r.
Each correct replica computes a checkpoint every K requests. A garbage-
collection protocol starts at the head when the first K requests in its log have
become stable. The head computes a hash value of the checkpoint, then cre-
ates and signs a checkpoint proof that contains the hash. It then sends the in-
complete checkpoint proof down the chain to the replica tail along with the
last stabilizing acknowledgment proof. Each non-head replica computes a hash
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value of its own checkpoint, and adds a signature of the hash to the checkpoint
proof. The replica tail drops the checkpoint proof from the shuttle carrying the
acknowledgment proof to the witness chain (as part of the acknowledgment-
retransmission protocol).
The tail also verifies the checkpoint proof. Upon success, it removes the first
K requests from its log and discards any older checkpoints it may have. The tail
then sends the complete checkpoint proof along the replica chain to the head.
Each replica en route repeats the same thing to truncate its log and discard any
checkpoints older than the one in the checkpoint proof.
5.6.7 Reconfiguration
Reconfiguration faces three concerns:
• Olympus implementation: a straightforward approach to implement the
Olympus service is to use an external BFT service, such as PBFT [53] or
Zyzzyva [91].
• Secret-key verification: during a state transfer under the strong adversary
assumption, the new members of a new configuration receive order proofs
signed by the secret keys of the current configuration. We need to find a
mechanism for the new members to verify those signatures.
• Configuration Assignment: as we cannot precisely determine a failed mem-
ber in an unprovable failure, we have to replace more than just the faulty
members. How many members a reconfiguration replaces in an unprov-
able failure directly affects the efficacy of Shuttle.
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In this section we will address the latter two concerns. Implementing Olympus
efficiently is a topic for our future work.
Secret-key Verification
During a state transfer, members of the new configuration need to verify secret-
key signatures in the order and checkpoint proofs used internally in the current
configuration. Unless a member is carried over from the current configuration,
it does not have the necessary secret keys to verify the signatures. We call such
members new members.
When a new member wants to verify a secret-key signature, it broadcasts
the signature to all members of the current configuration and waits for t + 1
approvals. A current member approves a signature only if it is valid, and it
sends the approval to the new member. When the new member receives t + 1
approvals, it accepts the signature. The number of approvals ensures that at
least one correct member in the current configuration has verified the signature.
Note that while the protocol does not terminate if the signature is invalid, the
state transfer is guaranteed to terminate since there are at least t+ 1 valid state-
transfer responses.
Configuration Assignment
Shuttle monitors and detects/suspects failures when it observes message cor-
ruption or loss. In many cases, the failures are unprovable, leading to the need
of replacing more than one member. Here we present a heuristic that lever-
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ages the chain communication pattern to limit the number of members being
replaced in a reconfiguration to two in the common case.
Assume that we have a coordinator and that m is the message being cor-
rupted or lost. The coordinator runs an interrogation protocol with the current
configuration to identify which members are to be replaced. Starting from the
member that published the FDS event back to the head, the coordinator asks
each member in the chain for m. If a member has received and individually
verified m, it replies with m. Otherwise, the member replies with a no. The
interrogation stops with the first reply of m. There are three cases:
• If the coordinator successfully verifies a response that contains m, then
the member that replied and its successor (in the chain order, from head
to tail) are replaced. In case the member is the one that published the FDS
event, then it is the only member to be replaced.
• If the coordinator fails to verifym, then the member that replied is the only
member to be replaced.
• If all of the replies (including the one from the head) are no, then the head
is the only member to be replaced.
The interrogation protocol does not guarantee to replace every failed member,
nor does it guarantee to replace only failed members. But it guarantees to re-
place at least one failed member. If a new configuration fails to become ready,
the next reconfiguration will replace the entire group to make sure that all failed
members are eliminated.
The role of a coordinator can be played by Olympus or, if we can assume
that newly allocated processes stay correct during a reconfiguration, a new process.
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The result of the interrogation protocol is passed to Olympus to determine the
new configuration.
5.7 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the overhead of the Shuttle protocol under both
strong and weak adversary assumptions. The evaluation is done by both theo-
retical analysis and experimental measurements. We also compare Shuttle with
existing protocols.
5.7.1 Analysis
The bulk of overhead in Shuttle, similar to other fault tolerant protocols, lies
in the computational overhead of cryptographic operations and the communi-
cation overhead of the incurred extra messages. The overhead of processing a
message differs depending on the types of adversaries as well as the source and
destination of the message.
Number of Cryptographic Operations
We measure the computational overhead by the number of cryptographic oper-
ations performed in the processing of each request. Because we use MAC sig-
natures under the strong adversary assumption, and CRC signatures under the
weak adversary assumption, signing and verifying incur the same cost and are
counted together. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 summarize the numbers of cryptographic
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Strong Adversary Strong Adversary
Steps Client-Server Server-Server
Attestation tr + 1 2tstr + 2ts + tr + 1
Pre-verification t2r + 2tr + 1 2tstr + t2r + 2ts + 2tr + 1
Verification t2r + tr t2r + 2tr
Ordering 3t2r + 3tr 3t2r + 3tr
Acknowledgment 4tr + 2 4tstr + 4t2s + 6ts + 4tr + 2
Total 5t2r + 11tr + 4 8tstr + 4t2s + 5t2r + 10ts + 12tr + 4
Bottleneck 4tr + 2 3ts + 4tr + 2
(at any replica)
Table 5.3: The number of MAC operations per request under the strong
adversary assumption when there are no failures. ts and tr are
the maximum number of failures that the sender and the re-
ceiver can tolerate, respectively.
operations performed in the processing of a request under the strong and weak
adversary assumptions, respectively. The analysis considers the general case
where the sender and the receiver may tolerate different numbers of failures.
We use ts for the sender and tr for the receiver.
The first column in Table 5.3 shows the numbers for a request sent from a
client to a replicated server under the strong adversary assumption:
• The client attests the request by computing tr + 1 MAC signatures for the
replicas in the destination group.
• The request goes through a pre-verification step at the destination. Each of
the tr + 1 replicas verifies a MAC signature and computes tr MAC signa-
tures for the other replicas. Overall, pre-verification performs (tr + 1)2 =
t2r + 2tr + 1 MAC operations.
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• In verification, each replica verifies tr MAC signatures in the acceptance
proof. Overall, verification performs (tr + 1)tr = t2r + tr MAC operations.
• In ordering, each of the tr + 1 replicas verifies the MAC signatures of the
preceding members and computes a MAC signature for each succeeding
member in the chain. Each of the tr witnesses only verifies the tr + 1
MAC signatures generated by the replicas. Overall, ordering performs
(tr + 1)2tr + tr(tr + 1) = 3t
2
r + 3tr MAC operations.
• Each of the 2tr + 1 members also computes a MAC signature to include in
the acknowledgment proof that the replicated server returns to the client.
And the client will verify all 2tr + 1 MAC signatures in the acknowledg-
ment proof. Overall, acknowledgment performs 4tr + 2 MAC operations
on both server and client sides.
The bottleneck, in term of cryptographic operations, can be at any replica, which
performs 4tr + 2 MAC operations.
The second column in Table 5.3 differs from the first one in that the sender is
a replicated server rather than a client. This leads to a different overhead in the
protocol steps:
• Each of the 2ts + 1 members in the sender computes a MAC signature for
each of the tr + 1 replicas in the destination. Overall, attestation performs
(2ts + 1)(tr + 1) = 2tstr + 2ts + tr + 1 MAC operations.
• The request goes through a pre-verification step at the destination. Each
of the tr + 1 replicas verifies the 2ts + 1 MAC signatures in the validity
proof and computes tr MAC signatures for the other replicas. Overall,
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pre-verification performs (tr + 1)((2ts + 1) + tr) = 2tstr + t2r + 2ts + 2tr + 1
MAC operations.
• Verification is exactly as before. It performs t2r + 2tr MAC operations.
• Ordering is exactly as before. It performs 3t2r + 3tr MAC operations.
• For acknowledgment, each of the 2tr + 1 members computes ts + 1 MAC
signatures to include in the acknowledgment proof that the receiver re-
turns to the sender. The sender will go through a two-round procedure to
verify the acknowledgment proof, similar to how the receiver verifies the
validity proof.
The first round is similar to the pre-verification step, except that each of
the ts + 1 pre-verifying members computes 2ts MAC signatures for the
other members (rather than ts for the other replicas in pre-verification).
This round performs (ts + 1)((2tr + 1) + 2ts) = 2tstr + 2t2s + 3ts + 2tr + 1
MAC operations.
The second round is similar to the verification step, except that all 2ts + 1
members participate (rather than ts + 1 in verification). Also, members
that participate in the first round verify only ts signatures as they do not
generate one for themselves, while others verify ts + 1 signatures. This
round performs (ts + 1)ts + ts(ts + 1) = 2t2s + 2ts MAC operations.
Overall, acknowledgment performs 4tstr + 4t2s + 6ts + 4tr + 2 MAC opera-
tions.
The bottleneck in this case also can be at any replica, which performs 3ts+4tr+2
MAC operations.
The first column in Table 5.4 shows the numbers of cryptographic operations
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Weak Adversary Weak Adversary
Steps Client-Server Server-Server
Attestation 1 ts + 1
Verification tr + 1 tstr + ts + tr + 1
Ordering (tr+1)(tr+2)
2
(tr+1)(tr+2)
2
Acknowledgment 2tr + 2 tstr + ts + 2tr + 2
Total (tr+1)(tr+2)
2
+ 2tr + 3
(tr+1)(tr+2)
2
+ 2tstr + 3ts + 3tr + 4
Bottleneck tr + 2 ts + tr + 2
(at chain tail)
Table 5.4: The number of CRC operations per request under the weak ad-
versary assumption when there are no failures. ts and tr are the
maximum number of failures that the sender and the receiver
can tolerate, respectively.
performed in the processing of a request from a client under the weak adversary
assumption:
• The client attests the request by computing a CRC signature.
• Each of the tr + 1 members of the receiver verifies the CRC signature on
the request. This comprises tr + 1 CRC operations.
• In the ordering, each of the tr + 1 members verifies the CRC signatures
of those preceding it and computes a CRC signature. This comprises
(tr+1)(tr+2)
2
CRC operations.
• For acknowledgment, each of the tr + 1 members computes a CRC signa-
ture to contribute to the acknowledgment proof. The client also performs
tr+1 CRC operations to verify the acknowledgment proof. This comprises
2tr + 2 CRC operations.
Unlike the protocol under the strong adversary, the replicas here do not per-
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form the same number of cryptographic operations. Replicas closer to the tail
need to check more signatures in an order proof than those closer to the head.
The bottleneck is therefore at the tail of the chain, which performs tr + 2 CRC
operations.
The second column in Table 5.4 differs from the first column in that it is for a
request from a replicated server. The computational overhead in the attestation
and verification steps differs by a factor of ts + 1, because the sender comprises
ts + 1 members rather than one. The acknowledgment step is simply the sum
of the receiver’s attesting the acknowledgment and the sender’s verifying it. As
for bottleneck, it is similar to the previous case. The tail performs ts+ tr +2 CRC
operations.
Message Overhead
We measure message overhead in two metrics: (1) message factor, and (2) mes-
sage latency. Message factor is the ratio between the number of messages sent
in processing an application message in Shuttle and in a non-fault-tolerant sys-
tem (which is two, one for the request, and the other for the response). Message
latency is the number of hops measured from when a client or a head of a repli-
cated server produces a request to when it receives a response.
Because we use a chain communication pattern, the number of messages is
the same as the length of the processing path, which goes through the source
chain in attestation, the destination replica chain in pre-verification (only under
the strong adversary assumption), the destination group chain in ordering and
execution, the source replica chain in pre-verification of an acknowledgment
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Message Factor Latency
Strong Adversary (Client-Server) 3tr+2
2
3tr + 2
Strong Adversary (Server-Server) 5ts+3tr+2
2
3ts + 3tr + 2
Weak Adversary (Client-Server) tr+2
2
tr + 2
Weak Adversary (Server-Server) 2ts+tr+2
2
ts + tr + 2
Table 5.5: Message overhead. ts and tr are the maximum numbers of fail-
ures that a sender and a receiver can tolerate, respectively.
(also only under the strong adversary assumption), and the source group chain
in the verification of an acknowledgment. The length of the processing path also
reflects message latency. But because a response (same as an acknowledgment)
is delivered to the head before it is passed down the chain, the latency values
are smaller than the path length by the length of the chain.
Table 5.5 shows the message overhead of the Shuttle protocol under strong
and weak adversary assumptions. Note that the number of messages (mes-
sage factor) is calculated per single application message. In practice we may
aggregate the output messages in the attestation step with the input-processing
message to lower the message factor.
5.7.2 Experimental Measurements
We are interested in the practical performance of Shuttle in the common case,
when the system has no failure.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.7: Module interfaces in a non fault tolerant system (a), and in a
fault tolerant system (b).
Implementation
We have implemented a prototype of the Shuttle protocol in Erlang. Our im-
plementation is approximately 2K lines of code under the strong adversary as-
sumption, and approximately 1.2K lines under the weak adversary assumption.
Olympus is implemented as an unreplicated external service.
Figure 5.7 describes the interfaces of the modules we implemented. The ap-
plication clients (C-App) and servers (S-App) communicate over the network
by calling Send and Receive functions supported by the network module
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(Comm). The Shuttle protocol is implemented as a middle layer (Shuttle) that
also supports Send and Receive.
Existing applications need a slight modification to work with Shuttle. The
clients and servers need to be recompiled to use Shuttle’s Send and Receive
rather than Comm’s. Furthermore, the servers need to support an additional
function, Checkpoint, that computes a checkpoint of the state of a server, used
in the garbage collection protocol.
As discussed earlier, the different adversary assumptions require differ-
ent cryptographic tools. Under the strong adversary assumption, our Shut-
tle implementation uses crypto:sha mac/2 with 160-bit secret keys to gen-
erate MAC signatures, and RSA with 1024-bit public keys to sign retransmit-
ted requests. Under the weak adversary assumption, the Shuttle protocol uses
erlang:crc32/1 to generate CRC signatures. We differentiate the variations
of the Shuttle implementation by naming them based on their main crypto-
graphic mechanism: HMAC-Shuttle is the variation that assumes a strong ad-
versary, and CRC-Shuttle is the one that assumes a weak adversary.
Notes On Non-Optimizations
Our prototype implementation forgoes some optimizations usually employed
in traditional approaches.
Batch Processing. Unlike traditional fault tolerant approaches, Shuttle does
not benefit from processing requests in batches. There are a few reasons. First,
batching is sometimes said to reduce the number of cryptographic operations
per request, because it spreads the cost of a cryptographic operation on mul-
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tiple messages. However, as Figure 5.8 shows, the computational cost of the
HMAC and CRC operations we use increases linearly with the size of the mes-
sage. So, batching does not reduce the computational cost of the cryptographic
operations, even though it reduces the number of such operations. Second, we
Figure 5.8: Computational costs of HMAC and CRC operations. HMAC x
indicates the HMAC function with a key of length x bits. The
key lengths do not matter as they are insignificant relatively to
the message lengths.
made the same observation that ZZ [132] does. Batching becomes less and less
effective as the application’s message processing time increases. And third, be-
cause of the chain communication pattern, we can pipeline requests and process
one request in each round.
Garbage Collection. Our implementation keeps the garbage collection con-
stant K = 1. The garbage collection protocol runs with the processing of every
request. Doing so we evaluate not only the request processing overhead but also
the overhead incurred by checkpointing and garbage collection. We keep the
measured overhead application independent by keeping the state of the sam-
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ple application small. The downside of running the garbage collection protocol
frequently is that the performance we measured is conservative.
Experimental Setup
In order to evaluate the Shuttle protocol, we have implemented a simple appli-
cation. The application models a distributed bank that has multiple branches.
Each branch keeps a simple database of accounts and their balances. Below we
focus on two of the supported operations:
Deposit: increase the balance of an account by a specified amount and
reply with the updated balance,
Transfer: decrease the balance of a source account by a specified amount,
reply with the updated balance of the source account, and issue a deposit
request to increase the balance of a destination account at a possibly dif-
ferent branch by the same amount.
For testing purposes, we optionally attach a large buffer to requests. The
buffer is copied in the reply. In the case of the transfer request, the buffer is also
attached to the deposit request that the source branch sends to the destination
branch.
The system is deployed on a cluster of 11 Dell 1950 Intel Xeon Quad-
core 2.33GHz nodes connected by 1Gbps Ethernet. Nodes 0 through 8 have 8GB
memory each. Nodes 9 and 10 each has 16GB. Each node runs Linux (kernel
2.6.9-55ELsmp), Erlang R14A, and OpenSSL 0.9.7d.
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In the experiments below, servers are deployed on nodes 1 through 10;
clients and the Olympus service are deployed on node 0. Each client waits for
the reply of its request before issuing the next request, but multiple clients can
issue requests concurrently.
In the experiments we try to answer three questions:
• How does our choice of programming language affect the performance of
the system?
• What are the throughput and latency of Shuttle in processing requests?
• What can we improve in future implementations?
Erlang Performance
To understand how our choice of programming language affects the perfor-
mance of the system, we evaluated its network performance and its compu-
tational performance.
For network performance, we measured the throughput and latency of the
distributed bank application without replication. In the experiments we ran two
unreplicated servers, for server-server transfer operations, and increased the
number of clients until the server was saturated. Figure 5.9 shows the results.
Each line in the graph contains six measurements, corresponding to 1, 2, 4, 8,
16, and 32 clients. The different lines correspond to different buffer sizes.
For deposit operations, the system achieves a peak throughput at 35.3
Kops/s, with 32 clients issuing deposit requests carrying an empty buffer. The
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.9: Throughput vs. Latency of the non-replicated bank applica-
tion.
corresponding latency at this rate is about 0.9 milliseconds per request. The
throughput yields an average of 28.3µs for the system to serve a request.
To factor out the network performance, we profiled the request execution at
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the server. On average, it takes the server 20µs to process each deposit. And so
less than 8.3µs can be attributed to the network.
For computational performance, we performed erlang:crc32/1 and
crypto:sha mac/2 on different buffer sizes. Figure 5.8 shows that we can
compute CRC-32 at a rate of about 795 Mbytes/sec, and SHA1-based HMAC
signatures at a rate of about 203 Mbytes/sec. This is, the CRC computation is
almost 4x faster than the HMAC computation.
Throughput vs. Latency
We repeated the experiments, but with replicated servers with t = 1 and t = 2,
to measure the throughput and latency of HMAC- and CRC-Shuttle. In these ex-
periments, the servers are saturated with 16 clients rather than 32. Figures 5.10
and 5.11 show the results.
As the graphs show, Shuttle’s performance is strongly affected by the mes-
sage size. It shows in the decreased performance when either the buffer size is
increased, or t is increased from 1 to 2, or both. When the value of t is increased,
more signatures are included in a message. It does not only increase the mes-
sage size, but also increases the computational time of signing and verifying the
signatures.
Bottleneck and Future Improvements
We study the request processing profile of HMAC- and CRC-Shuttle to under-
stand why their peak performances are 8x and 4x lower than the unreplicated
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5.10: Throughput vs. Latency of the HMAC Shuttle protocol.
system. We identified where the bottleneck is and what could be done to im-
prove performance in future implementations.
Figure 5.12 shows a sample profile of the processing a deposit under HMAC-
Shuttle with t = 1. The figure shows where time is spent and also the size of
145
(a)
(b)
Figure 5.11: Throughput vs. Latency of the CRC Shuttle protocol.
messages generated for handling the request. The bottleneck in this case is the
processing that happens at the tail of the replica chain, which first has to ver-
ify the validity proof and generate a new acceptance proof, and later it has to
check the completed acceptance proof and the order proof, add its own signa-
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Figure 5.12: Sample request processing profile for HMAC Shuttle, t = 1,
0KB buffer. The numbers in black boxes are message sizes, in
bytes. The other numbers are processing times, in microsec-
onds.
Figure 5.13: Sample request processing profile for CRC Shuttle, t = 1,
0KB buffer. The numbers in black boxes are message sizes, in
bytes. The other numbers are processing times, in microsec-
onds.
tures to the order proof and the acknowledgment proof, take a checkpoint, sign
the checkpoint proof, and collect garbage. The bottleneck consumes 249µs for
each deposit, which translates to about 4 Kops/s. It explains the 4 Kops/s peak
throughput of HMAC-Shuttle in Figure 5.10(a) (first curve). When adding a 4KB
buffer to each deposit request, the 1Gbps network bandwidth takes about 32µs
extra for sending/receiving a request. The bottleneck (the replica tail) requires
three such instances (receiving the buffer from the client, sending it to the head,
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and sending it to the witness as part of the response). In addition, it takes ap-
proximately 19µs to compute a HMAC signature of 4KB data. There are two
HMAC operations at the bottleneck involving the buffer (one for the request
coming from the client, and the other is for the response sent to the witness).
With the extra time, the bottleneck takes 383µs to process each deposit. This
translates to a throughput of 2.6Kops/s. And it explains the peak bandwidth of
the second curve in Figure 5.10.
Similarly, Figure 5.13 shows a sample profile of the processing a deposit un-
der CRC-Shuttle with t = 1. Besides a shorter path, shorter processing times,
and smaller messages, we can also see that processing is better balanced be-
tween the head and the tail of the chain. The bottleneck (even though it shows
only a slight difference) is at the head, which takes 121µs to process a deposit.
This translates to a throughput of slightly higher than 8Kops/s. It explains
the peak throughput of the first curve in Figure 5.11. When attaching a 4KB
buffer, the head takes an extra 32µs for receiving the buffer from the client, an-
other 32µs for sending it to the tail, and one more 32µs for sending the buffer
in the response. The head also takes an extra 19µs for computing the digest of
the request to include in the order proof. The extra overhead caused by the 4KB
increases the bottleneck to 236µs, which yields about 4.2Kops/s as depicted by
the second curve in Figure 5.11. The buffer included in the response from the
head reveals an optimization left unimplemented.
The profiling studies suggest the following improvements for future imple-
mentations:
• In CRC-Shuttle, a CRC checksum could be used as the digest of a request
as it is already good for serving as a digital signature.
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• The reason that the request size strongly affects our prototype’s perfor-
mance is because it is single threaded in the critical path. In a future im-
plementation, we could exploit the multi-core/hyperthreading processor
architecture and the duplex feature of modern network interface cards to
parallelize the request processing task at each member to four subtasks:
receiving messages, Shuttle processing requests, application processing
requests (only at replicas), and sending messages.
5.7.3 Comparison with Prior Work
The literature is rich with approaches for making Byzantine fault tolerance prac-
tical. Starting from PBFT [53], various projects [32, 65, 90, 123, 80] aim to re-
duce latency and increase throughput. Recently, more work has tried to address
concerns beyond latency and throughput. For instance, Steward [38] and Men-
cius [105] address how one would scale a BFT service over a wide-area network.
Aardvark [63] and Zyzzyvark [62] focus on sustainable performance rather than
peak performance. And Separation14 [134], BFT2F [102], and ZZ [132] aim for
reducing the replication cost of BFT services.
Shuttle focuses mainly on reducing replication cost. But unlike existing
work, Shuttle targets distributed services, in which the original, non-fault-
tolerant services consist of multiple unreplicated servers. Considerable com-
plexity of Shuttle rises from the interaction among servers, especially from the
prevention of malicious processes from colluding across different replicated
14The authors did not give a short name to their paper, “Separating agreement from execution
for Byzantine fault tolerant services.” We take the liberty to call it “Separation” for short.
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servers to harm the system. To the best of our knowledge, no existing work
has ventured in the same direction.
Table 5.6 compares Shuttle with some related work. All the compared re-
lated work has strongly consistent semantics and avoids expensive RSA digi-
tal signatures. We include ZZ for its similar goal of reducing replication cost,
Zyzzyvark for its similar goal of tolerating client failures, and Aliph for its simi-
lar chain communication pattern. We also compare Shuttle with Zyzzyva for its
well known performance, and with PBFT for historical purposes. To put Shuttle
into context, we adapt the numbers in tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5, taking only the
client-server case and assuming that Shuttle uses batch processing with batch
size b. For other approaches, we get the numbers published by the authors,
except:
• the numbers of PBFT are taken from the Zyzzyva paper [90];
• the latency number of Aliph is the common case where there is contention
from multiple clients rather than the best case where there is no con-
tention;
• the numbers of Zyzzyvark are computed as follows (with t = u = r to
make it comparable):
– the number of processes is 3t + 1, assuming that request quorum,
order, and execution groups co-locate;
– the number of replicas is 2t + 1, as it uses separation of agreement
from execution;
– the computational bottleneck is 2t + 3t
b
+ 2 MAC operations at the
leader of the order group, where it needs to check 2t+ 1 MAC signa-
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tures from the request quorum, and, similar to Zyzzyva, signs 3t
b
for
the other members plus 1 for the client;
– the message latency is 4, as the critical path of a common-case request
processing is client→ request quorum→ order leader→ order mem-
bers→ client, assuming each replica co-locates with a member of the
order group;
• the numbers of latency for ZZ are not published, but they are supposedly
the same as PBFT because ZZ uses the same ordering protocol as PBFT.
As for the qualitative properties, all the listed approaches by design tolerate
strong adversaries except CRC-Shuttle. The approaches maintain safety against
faulty clients, but they do so at different costs:
• PBFT: as PBFT uses MAC signatures in all but view-change and new-view
messages, a malicious client can send to a non-leader member a request
with only one valid MAC signature for that member. The member will
consider the message as valid, relay it to the leader (who discards it), and
time out waiting for the execution of the request. The malicious client
triggers a reconfiguration at a correct replicated server.
• Zyzzyva: a malicious client can send a request to the leader with a MAC
vectors containing t valid entries and diverge the replicas’ state. The re-
quest authentication protocol (presented in Kotla’s dissertation [89]) will
resolve in a few communication rounds using RSA signatures and a roll-
back of the t replicas that have executed the request.
• Aliph: a malicious client can perform the same misbehavior as above.
When a replica cannot verify its MAC entry, the execution stops. The client
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Zyzzyvark HMAC Shuttle
Processors Dual-core Pentium IV 3GHz Xeon Quad-core 2.33GHz
NICs 1Gbps Ethernet 1Gbps Ethernet
Language Java 1.6 Erlang R14A
Operating System Linux 2.6 Linux 2.6
t = 1, small requests 3.3Kops/s, 73ms, 1B 4Kops/s, 4ms, 0B
t = 2, small requests 1.7Kops/s, 90ms, 1B 2.5Kops/s, 3.2ms, 0B
t = 1, large requests < 1Kops/s, > 70ms, 10KB 1.58Kops/s, 10.2ms, 16KB
Table 5.7: Practical performance comparison between HMAC-Shuttle
(client-server) and Zyzzyvark. The measurements are through-
put, latency, and request size.
will trigger the rollback of the request by sending a PANIC message and
collecting an abort history.
• Zyzzyvark: the request quorum helps to filter out harmful requests from
malicious clients. Zyzzyvark only diverges from the common-case request
processing protocol when there is a failure in its replicated server.
• ZZ: ZZ uses the same protocol as PBFT and suffers from the same weak-
nesses.
To shed some light on Shuttle’s performance in practice, we relate it to
Zyzzyvark for its recency (Zyzzyvark was published in SOSP’2009), its similar
use of a high-level programming language, and its similar robustness against
faulty clients. Zyzzyvark is implemented in Java, while Shuttle is prototyped in
Erlang. For Zyzzyvark we consider the cases t = u = r = 1 and t = u = r = 2,
where the request quorum, order, and execution nodes are co-located. Table 5.7
summarizes the results.
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In Table 5.7, Shuttle’s measurements are copied from our experiments.
Zyzzyvark’s measurements are copied from Figures 7 and 9 in the UpRight
paper [62], with throughputs scaled up 8% and latencies scaled down 10% to
take into account the difference between JS-Zyzzyvark (the read values) and J-
Zyzzyvark (fairer comparison with Shuttle as both do not write to disk). These
percentages are suggested by Figure 5 in the same UpRight paper. Note that
Shuttle performs deposit operations (approximately 20µs), while Zyzzyvark
produces responses upon null requests.
While we are uncertain of the impact of the different processor architectures
on performance, the rates of changes in the measurements suggest that Shuttle
scales better with the request size and the group size. Another interesting ob-
servation is that while Shuttle has larger theoretical latencies than Zyzzyvark’s,
its actual latencies are about an order of magnitude lower than Zyzzyvark’s.
5.8 Discussion
This chapter proposes and evaluates the Shuttle protocol, a novel Byzantine
replication approach that uses only t + 1 replicas and t witnesses, the latter are
necessary only if working under the strong adversary assumption. Our pro-
posal makes the following main contributions:
• a consideration for distributed applications as a whole, which addresses
collusion across replicated servers;
• a protocol design that emphasizes high throughput;
• a tradeoff between fault masking efficacy and replication cost;
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• a tradeoff between fault tolerance strength and both replication cost and
performance;
• a common-case evaluation of our approach in both analysis and experi-
mentation.
Even though Shuttle implements an asynchronous distributed application,
the protocol can be used to implement a synchronous or partially synchronous
distributed application. The key is that after GST, a failed replicated server is
reconfigured in bounded time and a correct replicated server processes an input
in bounded time as well.
Our evaluation shows that our approach achieves a common-case perfor-
mance comparable to existing state-of-the-art approaches, while it cuts the cost
by one-third to a half. However, the evaluation is still in its preliminary stage.
In future work, we aim to evaluate the reconfiguration performance as well as
study cases of Shuttle being applied to some practical distributed applications.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter concludes the dissertation. We begin by reviewing the contribu-
tions in Section 6.1. Then we discuss future research directions in Section 6.2.
6.1 Contributions
The dissertation makes the following main contributions:
• A new approach toward building fault tolerant distributed applications.
The approach is presented informally, with discussion of how to relate it to
existing general fault tolerance approaches. We have solved the challenges
in this dissertation using this new approach.
• An novel ordered broadcast protocol, called OARcast. OARcast ensures
when a sender broadcast messages to a number of receivers, the receivers
deliver the same sequence of messages from the sender. The property is
preserved even when the sender is malicious.
• A translation technique that can be used to strengthen distributed appli-
cations automatically. The technique makes few assumptions about the
distributed applications. And thus it can be applied in a larger class of
distributed applications than previous approaches.
• A scalable translation technique that can be applied to large-scale dis-
tributed applications. The technique is adaptive to hosts joining and leav-
ing and topology changes. It also ensures application processes handle
inputs fairly.
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• A replication protocol that uses t + 1 replicas to tolerate t Byzantine fail-
ures. When facing strong adversaries, the protocol may use t witnesses in
addition to the replicas. But when the adversaries are weak, the protocol
does not require the witnesses and uses a cheaper cryptographic primitive
for reducing computational overhead.
6.2 Future Directions
6.2.1 Unifying Rollback Recovery and State Machine Replica-
tion Approaches
Rollback recovery approaches such as message logging and checkpointing were
invented for saving parallel scientific applications from losing hours or days
of computational work when failures occur. State machine replication was in-
vented for fault tolerance in distributed systems, where the machines are more
loosely synchronized to others compared to parallel systems that are targeted
by rollback recovery. Rollback recovery approaches also make stronger as-
sumptions about the environment, as parallel scientific applications are usu-
ally run in a cluster or a supercomputer that is specialized and isolated from
other applications. State machine replication on the other hand makes fewer
assumptions about the environment, as some of its target applications (e.g., air-
craft controller) are required to work in hostile environments. The different
targeted applications and environments lead to different characteristics in the
resulting rollback-recovery and state-machine-replication protocols. And the
two approaches have been considered fundamentally different.
157
In Section 1.2 we informally show how the fault tolerance approaches re-
late. Rollback recovery and state machine replication approaches seem to focus
on different facets of the fault tolerance problem. In particular, rollback recov-
ery focuses on how to retain consistent state over failures, while state machine
replication further deals with validity of inputs. When mapped to our model,
the state machine replication approach implements the notary service and sur-
rogate abstractions, which do not exist in a rollback recovery system.
A possible future direction is to formalize our approach in Section 1.2. The
final model of a fault tolerant distributed application would be similar to our
informal model in that it (1) separates the concerns of retaining state over fail-
ures from preventing messages and state from being undetectably altered, and
(2) separates the concern of masking failures on the fly from fault tolerance in
general. But unlike our informal model, the formal model should identify the
precise properties for each concern.
The formalized approach would unify rollback recovery and state machine
replication approaches (possibly other fault tolerance approaches as well). The
unification would allow us to bring advancements from one area to another.
The next two subsections are examples.
6.2.2 Strengthening Rollback Recovery Approaches
Rollback recovery approaches such as message logging and checkpointing are
restricted to tolerating only crash failures. This is due to two reasons: (1) appli-
cation processes do not check input messages and recovery information saved
into stable storage (e.g., input messages, checkpoints) for their authenticity and
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validity, and (2) the stable storage may not be strong enough to make saved data
retrievable when Byzantine faults occur.
Both problems can be overcome. The first one can be overcome by imple-
menting a notary service that turns data (e.g., input messages, checkpoints) to
self-verifiable data. The second problem is not a fundamental shortcoming of
rollback recovery approaches, as they assume a stable storage abstraction rather
than a specific implementation. One only needs to use an appropriate stable
storage implementation.
While it is questionable that the overhead of the resulting BFT rollback re-
covery protocols will be practical, this question should be limited to the imple-
mentation rather than the abstraction. With future advancements in hardware
and software systems, it is certainly possible that the overhead will become ac-
ceptable.
6.2.3 Optimizing State Machine Replication Protocols
As discussed in Section 1.2, the replicas of an application process in a state-
machine-replication system implement stable storage. Similar to the pessimistic
message logging approach, the application process stores each input message
to stable storage before it sends any further message to another application pro-
cess, or to the clients.
The pessimistic message logging approach is simple in recovery, but it is
slow in the common case, when there is no failure. Alternatives have been
proposed to make the common case faster. For example, the optimistic mes-
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sage logging approach stores input messages to stable storage asynchronously,
letting the application process send output messages to other application pro-
cesses as soon as possible. The optimistic message logging approach achieves
higher performance in the normal case, but it complicates recovery. Another ex-
ample is causal logging, which makes sure that the causal past [93] of each pro-
cess is either stable or available locally to the process. The causal message log-
ging approach is balanced between the pessimistic and optimistic approaches.
Similar to pessimistic message logging, fault tolerant distributed applica-
tions using SMR protocols are known to be expensive, and they are rarely de-
ployed in production environments. A possible future research direction is to
optimize SMR protocols used in fault tolerant distributed applications, so that
they can produce outputs before the causal input has been saved to stable stor-
age. The distributed applications that use the optimized SMR protocols behave
similarly to optimistic and causal message logging protocols.
The relaxing of synchrony of the protocol steps is similar to Virtual Syn-
chrony [44, 43], and Speculator [112]. They however differ in scale. Speculator
is at the operating system level and increases performance of individual file sys-
tems. Virtual Synchrony is at the process group level. It can help to implement
faster stable storage. The proposed future work is at the distributed application
level. It is orthogonal to Virtual Synchrony and Speculator and can benefit from
them.
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6.2.4 Byzantine Fault Tolerant Transaction Commit Protocols
The transaction commit problem is a central part of transaction processing sys-
tems. It guarantees that when the participants of a transaction need to make an
irrevocable decision, they will make the same decision. Traditionally, the trans-
action commit problem assumes only crash failures. And as a result, transaction
processing systems were limited to tolerate only crash failures.
Though the transaction commit and the Byzantine agreement problems
are considered to be different [76], various works have proposed solutions to
Byzantine fault tolerant transaction processing systems (e.g., [72, 129]). They
apply the SMR approach to replicate each participant and solving the Byzantine
agreement problem within each replicated participant. The main challenge this
approach encounters is efficiency: (1) Byzantine agreement protocols involve
high message complexity, and (2) the Byzantine agreement problem is not solv-
able when the environment is asynchronous. In practice, this means that the
replicated participant may take arbitrarily long to send its vote to the coordina-
tor.
Using our translation techniques, we can transform a transaction commit
protocol from crash-tolerant to Byzantine-tolerant. The resulting protocol does
not need to solve the Byzantine agreement problem, has lower message com-
plexity (linear vs. quadratic), and therefore is potentially more practical. A
possible future research project is to verify this observation.
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